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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays investigating welfare implications of R&D 
policies in the presence of spillovers. Unlike previous studies, it focuses on modeling 
endogenous or asymmetric spillovers to obtain more practical welfare implications. Each 
essay introduces a representative 'R&D model with spillovers'. The game we consider in 
each essay is basically composed of two stages: the R&D stage and the output stage. Each 
essay identifies the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), and provides meaningful 
policy implications in terms of welfare. 
The first essay examines the policy implications of a research joint venture (RJV) 
while introducing endogenous spillovers and costly RJV. The research joint venture is costly 
in the sense that the firms incur two kinds of costs when they join in an RJV: RJV formation 
costs and spillover costs. RJV formation costs are modeled as fixed while spillover costs 
increase with the amounts of information sharing within an RJV. We derive the condition 
under which firms do not have an incentive to form an RJV, and identify when firms within 
an RJV share information completely. This essay also finds that private interests with an RJV 
are not consistent with public interests for a wide range of RJV formation costs, which 
suggests the potential need for active government intervention with respect to RJV formation. 
The second essay investigates the welfare effects of intellectual property rights 
(1PR) protection in terms of north-south trade. It asks which southern countries, if any, 
should provide more IPR protection, assuming that the differentiated IPR protection among 
southern countries can be made through a WTO (World Trade Organization) agreement. 
Only the northern country innovates, and n-1 southern countries have different capacities to 
absorb knowledge from the northern innovations. The outcome of innovations reduces the 
unit production cost of the northern firm, and also provides benefits to the southern firms 
through spillovers. This essay shows that the southern countries can be classified into three 
groups in terms of the welfare effects of spillovers. The countries in the first group are better 
off from relaxed IPR protection both in their own countries and in the other countries. The 
countries in the second group are better off from spillovers in their country, but worse off 
from spillovers in the other group. The third group suffers from welfare loss whenever IPR 
protection is relaxed in any southern country. The northern country is worse off by relaxed 
vii 
IPR protection in any southern country for wide ranges of R&D efficiency and the sum of 
spillovers. 
The last essay combines the analysis of the R&D cooperation with the strategic trade 
policy theory. Endogenizing spillovers (information sharing) within an RJV, it identifies 
when the RJV works as a tool of strategic trade policy, and provides its welfare implications. 
Many results obtained in the third market structure become reversed in the integrated market 
structure. In the situation where only the home country allows an RJV formation while the 
foreign country does not, allowing an RJV benefits the home country in the third market 
structure, but it hurts the home country in the case of integrated market structure if spillover 
costs are sufficiently high. We also identify the Nash equilibria of the policy game in which 
both the home and the foreign countries simultaneously decide whether to allow an RJV or 
not, and investigate the welfare implications when both the home and the foreign countries 
allow an RJV formation in each country. 
1 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The outcome of research and development (R&D) activities is usually interpreted as 
a piece of new knowledge or information. Because the knowledge has basically the nature of 
a public good, the use of new knowledge by one agent does not exclude its use by another, 
and the innovators cannot keep non-payers from using it.1 Consequently, innovators are not 
likely to recover the full value that they generate from the research outcomes, and this 
undermines the incentive to do R&D. One well-known way to deal with this problem is 
providing innovators with intellectual property rights (EPR) in the form of a patent. However, 
as many empirical studies have documented, patents do not always prevent knowledge 
spillovers to rival competitors (see Mansfield et al. 1985, Jaffe 1986, Levin et al. 1987). 
Griliches summarizes one common result of empirical studies as follows: "R&D spillovers 
are present, their magnitude may be quite large and social rates of return remain significantly 
above private rates" (see Griliches (1995), p72). 
The theoretical literature has paid considerable attention to the encouragement of 
R&D cooperation or the formation of a research joint venture (RJV) as a way to internalize 
spillovers.2 It generally investigates the relative efficiencies of R&D competition and 
cooperation in raising final output production and enhancing social welfare.3 A consistent 
finding is that the R&D cooperation may increase a firm's incentive to invest in R&D by 
internalizing spillovers. One more important result is that research joint ventures (RJVs) may 
result in the highest R&D outcome, output production, and welfare level if firms within an 
RJV can share information completely (see Kamien et al. 1992) 
However, there are some limitations to the theoretical literature dealing with 
spillovers. First, it usually assumes that spillovers are exogenously given and beyond the 
1 For a summary of this issue, see Geroski (1995). 
2 One concern of R&D cooperation is that cooperation may extend to the product market (Jacquemin 1988) 
3 Among seminal papers are Spence (1984), d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992), 
Suzumura (1992), Simpson and Vornortas (1994), and Ziss (1944). 
2 
controls of firms.4 Some treat spillovers (information sharing) within an RJV (or R&D 
cooperation) as the same as in the case without the RJV, while others assume maximal 
spillovers within an RJV. As Cohen and Levinthal (1989) argue, however, the degree of 
spillovers that each firm obtains from the other's innovations may be different across firms, 
depending on its ability to assimilate or absorb knowledge spillovers. It may also depend on 
how much each firm discloses its knowledge to the other. A number of factors, such as the 
degree of final market competition and technical substitutability, will affect each firm's 
disclosure of its knowledge. 
Second, the literature assumes that there are no obstacles when firms form an RJV 
and share information with each other. However, in a real economy, firms face many 
difficulties and costs associated with RJV formation and information sharing. As Pérez-
Castrillo and Sandoms (1996) argue, potentially profitable RJVs may not start because of the 
moral hazard problem between the partners. Also, the potential costs associated with forming 
an RJV will be large and may include contracting, monitoring, and management costs (see 
Harrigan (1986)). These costs are likely to increase, as the firm wants to share more 
information from the others. Finally, the issue of 'asymmetric spillovers' has rarely been 
studied in the theoretical R&D literature.5 In general, however, firms may differ in their 
absorptive capacities due to already existing differences in the knowledge base and 
organizational firm characteristics. Also, the degree of spillovers may be different across 
industries, depending on whether the industry is more R&D intensive or not (Levin et al. 
1987). Thus, it seems unrealistic to assume that all firms are identical in absorbing or 
assimilating knowledge spillovers. 
It is clear that more studies on endogenous and asymmetric spillovers are necessary 
as there are few previous studies on these issues, and we may get more practical policy 
implications from them. This dissertation introduces endogenous or asymmetric spillovers 
into a representative two-stage 'R&D model with spillovers'. The main purpose is to 
4 Some previous studies dealing with endogenous spillovers within an RJV are reviewed in chapter 3. 
5 The exceptions are Rosen (1991), De Bondt and Henriques (1995), and Amir and Wooders (1999). 
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investigate the welfare implications of two R&D policies: encouraging RJV formation and 
tightening intellectual property rights.6 
1.2 Dissertation organization 
Chapter 2 investigates policy implications of a research joint venture (RJV) while 
introducing endogenous spillovers and costly RJV. We derive the condition under which 
firms do not have an incentive to form an RJV, and identify when firms within an RJV share 
information completely. We find that private interests with an RJV are not consistent with 
public interests for a wide range of parameter values, and suggest the potential need for 
active government intervention on RJV formation. Chapter 3 introduces spillovers into the 
issue of intellectual property rights (IPR) in the context of north-south trade. Assuming 
southern countries face different spillovers, we ask which countries, if any, should provide 
more IPR protection. We investigate how spillovers from relaxed IPR protection in any 
southern country affect its welfare and welfare in the other countries. Chapter 4 combines the 
analysis of the R&D cooperation with strategic trade policy theory. Endogenizing spillovers 
(information sharing) within an RJV, it identifies when the RJV works as a tool of strategic 
trade policy, and provides its welfare implications. The last chapter provides general 
conclusions and discusses future areas of research. 
6 For more detailed explanation of these policies, see Katz and Ordover (1990). Katz and Ordover term these 
policies as ex-ante cooperation and ex-post cooperation, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 2. ENDOGENOUS SPILLOVERS AND COSTLY 
RESEARCH JOINT VENTURE 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous studies on R&D, spillovers, and RJV (research joint venture) focus on 
examining the role of spillovers (information sharing) in comparing outcomes between the 
R&D non-cooperation and the cooperation game (See De Bondt (1996) for a detailed 
survey). These studies usually treat spillovers as exogenous and beyond the control of firms 
regardless of the RJV (or R&D cooperation) existence.1 A consistent finding is that the R&D 
cooperation may result in better outcome especially when spillover parameter has sufficiently 
high value. However, as Katz (1986), Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998), and Poyago-Theotoky 
(1999) pointed out, it seems unreasonable to assume that spillovers within an RJV are 
exogenously given when we want to investigate the effect of RJV on economic performance. 
This chapter examines the policy implications of an RJV on total welfare. There are 
two specific contributions of this chapter. First, we introduce endogenous spillovers within 
an RJV into d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's model (1988). Few studies have dealt with 
endogenous spillovers within an RJV. Firms may be different in their ability to absorb or 
assimilate knowledge spillovers (Cohen and Levinthal (1989). Also, a number of factors, 
such as the degree of market competition and the nature of research discoveries, may affect 
the amount by which the firms benefit through spillovers. The other specific contribution is 
that we model costly RJV. The potential costs associated with forming an RJV will be large, 
and may include contracting, monitoring, and management costs (Harrigan (1986)). We 
assume that both RJV formation and spillovers are costly.2 
Assuming Coumot competition with a single homogenous good in a final market, 
we find that firms under the RJV do not share any information if spillover costs are 
sufficiently high. It is also shown that private interests with an RJV are not consistent with 
1 For example, see d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992) 
2 Vilasuso and Frascatore (2000) introduces costly RJV. However, they do not endogenize spillovers within an 
RJV even though they consider a case where firms under the RJV face the cost, which depends on the degree of 
spillovers. 
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public interests for a wide range, which suggests the potential need for active government 
intervention on RJV. To obtain these results, RJV formation costs, spillover costs, and 
involuntary spillovers play a crucial role. 
The main policy implications are as follows. First, if spillover costs are sufficiently 
high but the degree of involuntary spillovers is sufficiently low, then the government should 
discourage firms from joining in an RJV if RJV formation costs are relatively low. However, 
it does not have to implement any policy for relatively high RJV formation costs since 
private and public interests are consistent. Second, if both spillover costs and the degree of 
involuntary spillovers are sufficiently high, then government intervention is unnecessary for 
very low or very high RJV formation costs, while it should encourage firms to join in an RJV 
for median RJV formation costs. Finally, when spillover costs are sufficiently low, the same 
results as in the second case are obtained, but it is shown that the critical value of RJV 
formation costs is different. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on 
spillovers and RJV. Section 3 sets up the model and examines possible equilibria. Section 4 
focuses on welfare comparisons, and policy implications on RJV are addressed in section 5. 
The last section provides concluding remarks. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Most of the R&D literature deals with spillovers as exogenous and beyond the 
control of firms. Some papers treat spillovers (information sharing) within an RJV as the 
same as those that occur when there is no RJV, while others assume that maximal spillovers 
occur within an RJV. For example, in d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), firms face the 
same spillovers with R&D cooperation as in the R&D non-cooperation game. Meanwhile 
Kamien et al. (1992) assume that the RJV can achieve complete information sharing. 
However, if we want to understand the effect of an RJV on innovative or economic 
performance, it seems reasonable to assume that spillovers are determined endogenously 
within an RJV. 
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Three theoretical works, Katz (1986), Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998), and Poyago-
Theotoky (1999), consider the R&D cooperation game where the firms choose spillovers 
(information sharing). Katz (1986) considers only the case of complementary research 
outcomes. The technology that one firm discovers, therefore, is always beneficial to the rival 
firm if the rival firm can absorb it through spillovers. Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) examine 
a number of factors that need to be considered when the spillovers are treated as endogenous. 
For example, the amount that the firms benefit through spillovers may be restricted, 
depending on whether firms operate in the same industry or in different industries and 
whether the research discoveries are technical substitutes or complements.3 Poyago-Theotoky 
(1999) extends d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's model by allowing firms to choose spillovers 
in both the R&D cooperation and the non-cooperation games. 
One common result of these works is that firms under the RJV choose maximal 
spillovers in the case where firms compete with a homogenous good in a final market. This 
result has to be reexamined since it is obtained by ignoring the fact that firms in a real 
economy face many difficulties and costs when they form an RJV, and when they absorb 
other firm's information or transfer their knowledge to other firms. The difficulties may be 
related to the moral hazard problem between the partners of a RJV in the sense that it is very 
difficult to impose the transfer of technology by contract. Pérez-Castrillo and Sandoms 
(1996) examine this problem and they show that because of this moral hazard problem, 
potentially profitable RJVs sometimes do not even start. Meanwhile, Vilasuso and Frascatore 
(2000) show, by introducing costly RJV, that the interests of firms are not necessarily 
consistent with social interests. They argue that the government should encourage R&D 
competition rather than the RJV (R&D cooperation) if forming an RJV is very costly. 
We extend previous studies mentioned above by simultaneously considering two 
issues: endogenous spillovers and costly RJV. In this sense, our model is a combination of 
the Poyago-Theotoky' s model (1999) with that of Vilasuso and Frascatore (2000). Poyago-
Theotoky introduces endogenous spillovers into d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's model, but 
she does not consider any cost when firms form an RJV or when firms increase the 
3 If research discoveries are pure technical substitutes, then neither firm can benefit from a rival firm's 
knowledge discovery (for more detail, see Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998)). 
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information sharing. Vilasuso and Frascatore do not endogenize spillovers even though they 
consider the case in which firms under the RJV face a cost, which depends on the degree of 
spillovers (see Table 1. The spillover parameter, /?, is not a choice variable in their paper). 
Table 2.1 Summary of the literature on 'information sharing' under RJV4 
Spillovers Costly 
RJV 
Conclusion 
(W/O RJV) (With RJV) 
Katz (1986) Exogenous 
Symmetric 
Endogenous 
( /? = !)  No 
The RJV has socially beneficial 
effects when there are spillovers in 
the absence of cooperation 
D'Aspremont 
& Jacquemin 
(1988) 
Exogenous 
Symmetric 
Exogenous 
No change 
No 
R&D cooperation results in better 
outcome than R&D competition 
for sufficiently high spillovers 
Kamien et al. 
(1992) 
Exogenous 
Symmetric 
Exogenous 
( /? = !)  No 
RJV( P  -1 ) may result in best 
outcome 
Katsoulacos & 
Ulph (1998/ 
Endogenous 
(1 = 0) 
Endogenous 
(1 = 1, 
0<y5<l) 
No 
Under RJV, the firms may choose 
the maximal or the non-maximal 
spillovers 
Poyago-
Theotoky 
(1999) 
Endogenous 
( 0  =  0 )  
Endogenous 
(j9 = l)  No 
Under RJV, the firms choose the 
maximal spillovers. RJV results in 
better outcome. 
Vilasuso & 
Frascatore 
(2000) 
Exogenous 
Symmetric 
Exogenous 
(/? = 1) 
Yes 
F  =  k  
F = k.+<j>/3 
The interests of firms are not 
necessarily consistent with social 
interests if RJV is costly 
4 P — 0 and P — 1 denote minimal and maximal spillovers, respectively. 
5 For the process innovation and Coumot competition, firms in an RJV choose the maximal spillovers while 
they choose non-maximal spillovers for the product innovation and Bertrand competition. 
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2.3 The Model and Equilibrium 
2.3.1 The Model 
In a final market, two firms sell a homogenous product whose inverse demand is 
given by P = A-Q, where Q = qt + , i, j = 1,2, i* j. qt represent the final output of firm 
i .  Firm z's unit production cost is a function of its own R&D investment (%,), the rival firm's 
R&D investment, and spillovers so that it is written by 
( 1 )  C i  =  c - Z r < T i Z j >  0 < e T i = 0  +  0 i < l ,  i j  =  1 , 2 ,  i *  j .  
The spillover parameter, a, is separated into two terms, industry-wide involuntary 
spillovers, 0 e [0,1], and a firm-specific spillover parameter, P e [0,1 - 0]. The magnitude of 
involuntary spillovers may depend on the degree of the intellectual property right (IPR) 
protection. For example, if IPR protection is perfect, then there may not be involuntary 
spillovers in the economy, i.e., 6 = 0.6 As in Cohen and Levinthal (1989), the term of the 
firm specific spillover, (3, may reflect a firm's ability to absorb or assimilate its rival firm's 
knowledge.7 We assume that the degree of spillovers from which a firm benefits is 
determined by this ability as well as involuntary spillovers.8 
The R&D technology exhibits diminishing returns to scale to R&D investment so 
that its cost is written by TC, (%,) = Y zV^- where y denotes R&D efficiency. A higher y 
implies lower R&D efficiency.9 The main assumption is that firms face two kinds of costs: 
RJV formation cost and spillover cost. If firms decide to join in an RJV, then they incur a 
fixed cost (F) as the fee for starting the RJV. Besides this cost, each firm that absorbs the 
rival firm's knowledge should incur other costs, which depend on the amount of information 
6 This is the case in Poyago-Theotoky (1999). 
7 Cohen and Levinthal call this ability 'absorptive capacity'. They take the form of spillover parameter as 
(Ti = 0 Pr 
8 Contrary to our set-up, in Poyago-Theotoky spillovers totally depend on the rival firm's voluntary knowledge 
transmission. Thus, the unit cost function is in the form of Ci = c — — cTj Zj • This specification will not 
qualitatively change any result obtained from this chapter. 
9 In d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's model, y may play an important role in the sense that both the second order 
and the stability condition depend on this parameter. 
9 
sharing.10 We assume that this cost increases with the amount of knowledge absorbed. For 
example, if each firm wants to absorb more knowledge from the rival firm, then it may have 
to send more researchers to the research joint venture. We refer to this cost as spillover (or 
information sharing) cost, which is given by Ki = &/?., i = 1,2. 
In the R&D non-cooperation game two firms simultaneously choose R&D efforts in 
the first stage and face Coumot competition in the second stage. We assume that the firms 
cannot choose the spillovers in the R&D non-cooperation game.11 Thus, the firms under the 
R&D competition face only involuntary spillovers ( <7, = 6 ). In the R&D cooperation game, 
firms decide whether to join in an RJV or not in the first stage. If they decide to join in a 
RJV, then they incur a fixed cost (F) as the fee for starting an RJV. Firms also choose both 
R&D efforts and the degree of information sharing to maximize joint profits in the first 
stage12 while they face output competition in the second stage. Note we assume the decision 
of joining in an RJV, and choosing both R&D investment and spillovers is taken together in 
the first stage.13 
2.3.2 Equilibrium 
The nature of the equilibrium is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. To find out the 
equilibrium, we first solve for the Nash equilibrium in the final market and then work 
backwards, solving for the R&D levels. In the final stage, each firm chooses quantity to 
maximize its own profits given the previous stage R&D investment. Firm f s final stage 
profi ts  are  as  fol lows:  m = (A-Q) q t  - c, q t  
10 Vilasuso and Frascatore (2000) consider an RJV formation cost that depends on the spillover amount 
(K = F + k/3), even though they do not make spillovers endogenous. 
11 Introducing endogenous spillovers into this game leads to the different result than in Poyago-Theotoky, in 
which the firms choose the minimal spillovers. With our set-up of spillovers, even firms under the R&D non-
cooperation game will choose maximal spillovers assuming there is no cost in doing that. 
12 We follow the assumption of joint profit maximation as the standard in the literature in the sense that the 
literature has uniformly assumed the joint profit maximization under the RJV. However, whether this 
assumption is appropriate requires further analysis since it is difficult to believe that firms, in reality, can write 
the contracts to maximize joint profits when they are competitors in a final market. Also, there may be firms' 
incentive to deviate from joint profit maximization. For example, if firm's profit is a portion of total profits 
under the RJV and the portion depends on its own R&D spending then it may be more profitable for the firm to 
deviate by maximizing its own profit choosing own R&D spending. Salant and Shaffer(1998) and Anbarci et 
al.(2002) briefly mention this issue. 
13 R&D cooperation game may consist of a three-stage game without changing any results obtained here. 
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Solving the problem yields final stage output and profit as a function of R&D 
investment and spillovers: 
2.3.2.1 Non-cooperative R&D competition 
In the first stage, each firm chooses the level of R&D investments to maximize its 
own profit, which is written by 
(3 )v,-,;-^)- |A-c+(2-g)f (2g-1)^-^.^;.^u. 
The first and second order conditions are as follows: 
d V i  _  2 { A - c  +  ( 2 - & ) X i  +  ( 2 0 - l ) z , } ( 2 ~ ~ # )  (4) ~YXi = 0, i * j ,  i  =  1,2. 
(5) <£L=2i-2 0) - r < 0 ,  i  — 1,2. This holds for V0 if y > ~ .  
From the first order condition, assuming a symmetric solution (%t = %j = %), we 
2(A-c)(2-0) 
can get the equilibrium R&D investment: % = • As seen in Henriques 
9 y  -  2(1 + 0 ) ( 2  -  0 )  
(1990), the equilibrium R&D investment under the non-cooperative game may not be stable 
for sufficiently low involuntary spillovers even though the second order condition is 
satisfied. She used the stability condition14, < 1, which yields in our set-up: 
3%, 2(2 - 0)(20 -1) 
2(2-0)-9/  
12 
<!<=> r  > — for 0<<9< 1.  Since the second order 
9 
condition for an interior solution of R&D investment under R&D competition is y  >  8/9 for 
0<#<1, the equilibrium R&D investment may not be stable if the degree of R&D 
efficiency lies between 8/9 and 12/9, i.e., 8/9 <y< 12/9. If the equilibrium is unstable, we 
may have to consider a comer solution where only one firm invests in R&D under the R&D 
14 When this condition is satisfied, the non-cooperative outcome is stable in the sense that the reaction functions 
cross "correctly" in the R&D space (See Henriques). 
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non-cooperation game. Since this is not what we want to focus on in this chapter, we impose 
Y > 12/9 throughout this chapter. Finally, using the equilibrium R&D investment yields the 
following outcomes, where N denotes the R&D non-cooperation game, and W denotes total 
welfare. 
n  _ 2(A - c)(2 - 0 )  N  _  3y ( A - c )  N  _  6 y ( A - c )  
9 y - 2 { l  +  0 ) ( 2 - 0 y  q  ~  9 y - 2 ( l  +  0 ) ( 2 - 0 )  ~  9 y - 2(1 +  0 ) ( 2 - 0 )  
v N _ Y ( A - c f { 9 y - 2 ( 2 - 0 f }  4 r ( A - c ) 2 { 9 y - ( 2 - 0 ) 2 }  
{ 9 y - 2 ( l  +  0 ) ( 2 - 0 ) } 2  '  { 9 Y - 2 ( l  +  0 ) ( 2 - 0 ) f  
2.3.3.2 Cooperative R&D competition (Research Joint Venture) 
The final stage profits for each firm are given by equation (2). In the first stage, the 
firms under the RJV maximize their joint profits while choosing the R&D investment and the 
amount of information sharing ( /?. ). The firms incur RJV formation cost ( F ) and spillover 
cost ( k/3i ). The joint profit function can be written by 
(6) Vy =^[{A-c + (2-cT,)Zi + (2ai -1 ) Z j f  +  { A - c  +  ( 2 -  c r d Z j  +  ( 2 a  j  - 1 ) Z , f ]  
-W + )%)/2}-{*# + &^}-2F, i*;, f = U. 
where V' denotes the joint profit under the RJV.15 
The first order conditions for joint profit maximization are 
<7>lF= î [ f A~ c + < 2~ "') z '+ < 2 < t ,~ +  
{ A  -  c  +  ( 2  - a d z  j  + (2 a j  - 1 ) Z l ) ( ~ Z ) ' \  ~  k  = 0, i j, i = 1,2. 
^- = |[{A-c + (2-£r,)Z, + ( 2 m - l )Z j ) ( 2  -  <7;) + 
{A-c + (2-a d Z j  + (2(7, -l ) Z i } ( 2 a j  - 1)]- Y = 0, i  *  j ,  i  =  1,2. 
The second order conditions are: for i ï j, i = 1,2 
15 Thus, the final per firm profit under the RJV is denoted by VJ / 2 
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(8) W =f > 0 • f? °  ^ {(2' ' a,)1+' (2tT' ' 1)1>' r< 10 for 05 - 1 if r >J  
Assuming that R&D investment and spillovers are determined together, we can 
solve the problem. From the second order condition with respect to spillovers, we should 
consider a comer solution (fii = /3j = /3 = 0 or = fi. = J3 = 1 - 6). That is, the firms under 
the RJV will choose the minimal or maximal spillovers. This is confirmed from the fact that 
Hessian matrix of spillovers is positive definite. That is, Ha = d 2 v /df i 2 k  >0, k =  i , j ,  and 
d 2 v /df f ,d*V /d  
?v/d0JWri'v/3fPl_ 
symmetric interior solution for R&D investment from (7) and (8).16 
|#1 = rZ?Zj>0 *here Hf = . Meanwhile, we can have a 
( 9 )  i f  
' . - " r f i - o -  i f  
As pointed out by Salant and Shaffer (1998, 1999), we may have to consider the 
asymmetric outcome of R&D investment. They show that for sufficiently low involuntary 
spillovers, the symmetric solution may not be optimal under R&D cooperation even though 
the firms are ex-ante identical. The point of Salant and Shaffer is that the asymmetric R&D 
investment results in lower aggregate production costs while it yields higher R&D costs 
compared to the symmetric R&D investment. Thus, asymmetric R&D investment may be 
optimal if the former effect dominates. However, the result obtained by Salant and Shaffer 
does not hold in our set-up. This is because we consider the case where the firms under the 
RJV choose the amounts of information sharing, and incur costs in doing so. With the same 
way as in Salant and Shaffer, we can derive the condition that the asymmetric R&D 
investment under the R&D cooperation may be optimal as follows:17 
16 Hessian matrix of R&D investment, H x  —  , is negative definite, 
10 
9 ' x ' ' 9 
17 The same condition in Salant and Shaffer is b y  < 2(1 — f f f  where b denotes the substitutability of product. 
Since 6=1 in our set-up, the condition is equivalent to y < 2 (1 — 0)2 , which is less than 2 for# 6 [0,1]. 
i.e., HÎk< 0 and IHx\ = y 2  —— {(2 - a f  +  (2<T -1)2} + 4 (1 - ( j f  > 0 for 0 < <7 < 1 if y  >  — .  
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(10) + + 
The condition in Equation (10) should satisfy the second order condition or stability 
condition18 we consider in this chapter, i.e., 7 >12/9. Recall that we get a corner solution of 
spillovers, that is, fik- 0 or f$k = 1 - 0, k - i, j. Also, note that asymmetric R&D investment 
(spillovers) should be excluded for symmetric spillovers (R&D investment) since it does not 
satisfy the first order condition of the joint profit maximization problem. Therefore, if 
asymmetric R&D investment could be optimal, one firm under the RJV should choose 
minimal spillovers (e.g., /?. = 0) given that the other firm could choose maximal spillovers 
(e.g., P j  =  1 - 0 ) .  Then, from Equation (10), we get y "  =  5 ( 0 - I ) 2 / 9 , which is always less 
than 12/9. This implies that asymmetric R&D investment cannot be optimal under the 
restriction of R&D efficiency we assume in this chapter.19 In sum, we consider two 
symmetric solutions of spillovers and R&D investment as the outcomes under the RJV. For 
each case, we get the following outcomes: 
Case MAX (/?. = /?. = 1- 0): y«x = 4(A_c) MAX = 3 y ( A  c )  m a x  =  6 y ( A  c )  
H
'  
z  9 7 - 8  H  9 y - 8  9 y - 8  
VMAX = 
2r ( A  c )  _ 2 _ ^ wMAX _  4 y  ( A  c )  ( 9 y  4) _2k(^_ ^  
9y-8 (97-8)' 
CaseMIN( j 3  = / 3  = 0 ) : Z M , N  =  2 ( A  c ) ( 1  +  ^ , q M ! N  =  3 ^ ( A  c )  ,qmin = 6 r ( A  c )  
J  9 7  -  2  ( 1  +  0 )  9 7  -  2  ( 1  +  0 )  9 y - 2 ( 1  +  0 )  
_ 27(A-c)= ^ _ 47(A-c)'{97-(l + 0)'} 
v  -  ———>w — 
97-2(1 + 0/ {97-2(l + 0)f 
18 In Salant and Shaffer, there exists a range of R&D efficiency and involuntary spillovers, for which both the 
condition for asymmetric solutions and the second order (or stability) condition are satisfied. See Fig. 1 on 
ppl97 of their article. 
There is one thing to note. It is intuitively obvious that strong diminishing returns to scale to R&D investment 
may exclude asymmetric solutions as an optimal equilibrium. This is true if R&D efficiency parameter, 7, is 
greater than 2 even when we do not consider endogenous spillovers. 
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We can identify when each case can occur as an equilibrium by comparing joint 
profits between Case MAX and Case MEsT: yMAX and VMIN • The profit of the firm within an 
RJV is bigger (smaller) under Case MAX than under Case MIN only if spillover costs are 
sufficiently low (high), i.e., VMIN >=< VMAX iff k  > = <  k c  =  — — (1 +  ^ )  }  
(97-8)(l-^){9y-2(l+^} 
Thus, the firms under the RJV choose minimal spillovers for sufficiently high spillover costs. 
This is a different result from previous studies where they find that the firms always share 
information completely within an RJV.20 The intuition is that the firms under the RJV always 
choose maximal spillovers without spillover costs since the increased output by sharing 
information completely has a dominant effect on profits. However, if spillover costs are 
sufficiently high the firms under the RJV do not have an incentive to share information 
because spillover costs affect profits negatively. 
It is straightforward to show that without RJV formation costs (F=0), the firms 
prefer joining in an RJV because profits are always bigger under the RJV than under the 
R&D non-cooperation. This result is intuitively obvious in the sense that firms under the RJV 
can choose the outcome under the R&D non-cooperation whenever it is a better outcome. 
Note that neither involuntary spillovers nor spillover costs affects firms' decision as to 
whether to join in an RJV without RJV formation costs.. 
Definition 1: Define the function V J ( k )  = max{yMA/(£),yM/Uf(&)} where, V J ( k )  -  V M A X  ( & )  
f o r  0  <  k  <  k c  a n d  V J ( k )  =  V M 1 N  ( k )  f o r  k  >  k c  •  
Lemma 1: As long as there is no RJV formation cost (F = 0), for any k > 0 the firms always 
prefer joining in a RJV. 
Proof: V J { k )  = max{yww (k ) ,v M A X  (&)}  >  V M I N  > 2V N  
20 See Katz (1986), Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998), and Poyago-Theotoky (1999). In these studies, the maximal 
spillovers are obtained, given the assumption of Cournot competition and homogenous good in the final market. 
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V J / 2  =  v M A X  1 2  
V J / 2  =  V M I N f 2  
RJV 
Non-cooperation 
> 
k c  k  
Figure 2.1 Firms' decision of whether to join in an  R JV (F = 0) 
If RJV formation costs exist ( F  >0),  spil lover costs as well  as RJV formation costs 
affect firms' decision as to whether they will join in an RJV or not. To be more specific, we 
consider two critical levels of RJV formation costs, Fvcl and FvcZ, where: 
It is straightforward to show Fvcl < Fvcl because the joint profit under Case MAX is bigger 
than under Case MIN (yMAX > yMIN) for k<kc • As seen in Lemma 2 (also, see Figure 2), 
there are three cases to analyze, depending on RJV formation costs. If RJV formation costs 
are very low, F < Fvcl, then the firms always prefer joining in an RJV whatever spillover 
costs are since the RJV, without RJV formation costs, can guarantee at least the gains of Fvcl 
as per firm profit, compared to the R&D non-cooperation. However, the firms do not have an 
incentive to join in an RJV when RJV formation costs are very high, F > Fvc2 • Spillover 
- k (  1 - 0 ) > O ,  where k  < k '  
D  =  { 9 y - 2(1 + 0 ) ( 2  - 0 ) } 2 -  { 9  y -2(2-0 ) 2 } ( 9  y  -  8) 
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costs do not affect firms' decision as to whether to join in an RJV because the maximum 
gains under the RJV each firm earns without RJV formation costs are Fvcl regardless of 
spillover costs. 
Lemma 2: Suppose that there exist RJV formation costs ( F  > 0). Then, a) for F  <  F v c l ,  firms 
will always join in an RJV regardless of the magnitude of spillover costs, b) for 
Fvci < F < Fvc2, firms will join in an RJV only if k < kc • c) for F > Fvc2 firms will not join 
in a RJV whatever spillover costs are. 
Proof: a) V 1 ( k ,F = 0)/2-VN = max{vM,N(k ,F = 0)/2,VMIN( k , F =  0)/2}-y"> Fvcl • 
b) v ~ J ( k  >  k c , F  =  0 ) / 2 ~V N  =  V M I N ( F  =  0)/2~ V N  =  F v c l  
V7(k<kc,F = 0)/2-VN = VMAX (k<kc,F = 0)/2-VN = Fvc2 > Fvcl 
c) r ' ik ,F =  0) /2-v N  = max{v M I N (k ,F =  0) /2 ,v M I N (k ,F =  0) /2} -v N  < Fvc2 
Meanwhile, for a moderate RJV formation cost ( Fvcl < F < fvcl ), firms have to consider 
spillover costs as a key determinant as to whether they will join in an RJV or not. If spillover 
costs are sufficiently high (k > kc), then firms will not join in an RJV because the firms 
under the RJV will choose minimal spillovers, but the profit is smaller with RJV formation 
costs F e (Fvcl,Fvc2) than under the R&D non-cooperation. If spillover costs are relatively 
low ( k < kc ), however, firms will join in an RJV because they will choose maximal 
spillovers under the RJV, and it will guarantee the gains of Fvc2, compared to R&D non-
cooperation. The intuition from Lemma 2 gives an explanation of why a potentially 
profitable RJV sometimes does not start in a real economy.21 By our analysis, the RJV will 
not be formed if RJV formation costs are very high or if RJV formation costs are moderate 
but spillover costs are sufficiently high. 
21 For an example see Pérez-Castrillo and Sandonis (1996). They explain this fact with moral hazard problem 
regarding information disclosure between partners. 
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Figure 2.2 Firms' decision of whether to join in an RJV ( F  >  0 ) 
2.4 Welfare implications 
In the previous section, we have examined when firms prefer joining in an RJV and 
when they choose minimal or maximal spillovers. The key determinants are RJV formation 
and spillover costs while the amount of involuntary spillovers does not affect firm's decision 
as to whether to join in a RJV. In this section, we compare outcomes between the R&D non-
cooperation and the R&D cooperation (RJV) in terms of total welfare, which is the sum of 
the profits and the consumer surplus (CS), and suggest some policy implications. 
The firms' incentive to invest in R&D is highest under Case MAX because they can 
completely internalize externality due to spillovers (^MA* > , and %MAX > %N). The final 
output increases with R&D investment. Thus, aggregate output is largest while market price 
is lowest under Case MAX ( PMAX < pMIN, pMAX < pN ), which implies that the consumer 
s u r p l u s  i s  b i g g e s t  w h e n  t h e  f i r m s  u n d e r  t h e  R J V  c h o o s e  m a x i m a l  s p i l l o v e r s  ( C S M A X  ^  C S M I N ,  
CSMAX>CSN)- Meanwhile, the degree of involuntary spillovers plays a key role in 
comparing outcomes between Case M3N and Case N. Note that Case MIN takes place as 
equilibrium under the RJV if spillover costs are sufficiently high. If the degree of involuntary 
spillovers is sufficiently high (5>1/2), R&D investment is greater under Case MIN than 
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under case N while the opposite is true for sufficiently low involuntary spillovers ( 0  <  1/2), 
i.e., xN >-<XMm <=> 6 <=> 1/2. Intuitively, for sufficiently high involuntary spillovers the 
firm under the R&D non-cooperation fears that its R&D investment intensifies cost 
advantage of the rival firm through spillovers, which decreases incentive of each firm to 
invest in R&D. However, if the degree of involuntary spillovers is low the effect of R&D 
investment on cost reduction of the other firm is small. The cost advantage is bigger for the 
firm that invests in more R&D, which increases the incentive to invest in R&D. On the other 
hand, the firms under the RJV consider the effect of R&D investment on joint profits. 
Obviously, we get the opposite result from the R&D non-cooperation since R&D investment 
of each firm increases (decreases) profits of the other firm for sufficiently high (low) 
involuntary spillovers. It is straightforward to show that aggregate output and consumer 
surplus is larger (smaller) under Case MIN than under Case N for sufficiently high (low) 
involuntary spillovers, i.e., QN >=< QMlN <=> 6 <=> 1/2 and CSN >=< CSM!N <=> 0 <=> 1/2. 
For the comparison of total welfare between the R&D non-cooperation and the RJV, 
we have to consider three factors: involuntary spillovers (information leakages), spillover 
costs, and RJV formation costs. First, suppose that spillover costs are sufficiently high, 
k> kc • The firms under the RJV choose minimal spillovers (Case MIN). If the degree of 
involuntary spillovers is sufficiently low, 9 < 1/2, total welfare under the RJV is less than 
under the R&D non-cooperation regardless of RJV formation costs (WMIN <WN )• This is 
because the consumers' loss due to reduced R&D investment under case MIN dominates 
firms' gains, that is, CSmN ^ CSN, |cSM/Ar - CSN\ > 2Fvcl = VM1N (F = 0) - 2yN. Recall that 
the firms join in an RJV only if RJV formation costs are relatively low, F  <  F v c l ,  while they 
do not for relatively high RJV formation costs, F > Fvcl • Thus, if RJV formation costs are 
relatively high ( F > Fvcl ), government intervention is unnecessary since the firms do not 
join in an RJV and total welfare is bigger under the R&D non-cooperation than under the 
RJV (see Figure 3). However, for relatively low RJV formation costs (F < Fvcl ) government 
should discourage firms from joining in an RJV since firms' decision of joining in an RJV is 
not desirable in terms of total welfare. A possible policy may be a tax on RJV. 
19 
Lemma 3: Suppose that spillover costs are sufficiently high (k>kc), but involuntary 
spillovers are sufficiently low (6< 1/2). Then, the government should discourage firms 
from joining in an RJV for F < Fvcl while it needs not implement any policy for F > Fvcl • 
Proof: It is a straightforward result from Lemma 2 and WM,N < WN for 6 < 1/ 2 
•MIN 
TOT 
Figure 2.3 Welfare comparison and Policy implication ( k >  k c ,  0  <  1 / 2 )  
However, if involuntary spillovers are sufficiently large {8 > 1/2), we have 
different policy implications. The consumers make gains under the RJV since aggregate 
output (market price) is greater (lower) than under R&D non-cooperation. The profit of the 
firm is also bigger under the RJV if RJV formation costs are relatively low, F < Fvcl • 
Therefore, with RJV formation costs, F < Fvcl, no government intervention is necessary 
since private and public interests are consistent in the sense that the firms prefer joining in an 
RJV while total welfare is bigger under the RJV than under the R&D non-cooperation. 
Government intervention is unnecessary even when RJV formation costs are very high22 
22 WMIN >=< WN ^  p <=> pwcl where, F"cl < Fwcl for #>1/2. 
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( F >  p * * ' ,  w h e r e  ( F  = 0 ) - W »  1 2 Y \ A - c f ( l - 2 m W , n  _  m d  
2 (9r-2(l + 0)2) {9r-2(l + 0)(2-S))2 
<£(#, 7) = (1 + 0)3 - 9/(1 + #) +6.757). But the reason is different from the previous case. 
Unlike in the previous case, RJV formation is not desirable in terms of both firms' profits 
and total welfare. Meanwhile, for moderate value of RJV formation costs ( Fvcl <F < Fwcl ), 
firms will not join in an RJV but total welfare is higher under the RJV than under the R&D 
non-cooperation. Therefore, government should encourage firms to join in an RJV. The 
subsidy on RJV may be a possible policy. 
Lemma 4: Suppose both spillover costs and involuntary spillovers are sufficiently high, i.e., 
k>kc and #>1/2. a) The government does not have to implement any policy for very low 
or very high RJV formation costs, i.e., F < Fvcl or F > Fwcl • b) The government should 
encourage firms to join in an RJV for moderate value of RJV formation costs 
( Fvcl < F < Fwcl )• 
Proof: WMIN >=< WN <=> F <=> Fwcl, where Fvcl < Fwcl for <9 >1/2. Also, see Lemma 2. 
W , V  
W M I N / 2  
yMIN/2 
F  
Figure 2.4 Welfare comparison and Policy implication ( k >  k c ,  0  > 1 / 2 )  
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Now, suppose that spillover costs are sufficiently low, k < k c  •  Then, the firms will 
completely share their information if they join in an RJV (Case MAX). Without RJV 
formation costs, total welfare is maximized under case MAX ( CSMAX ^ CSMm, CSN and 
YMAX > YMIN YN) With RJV formation costs, total welfare under case MAX is greater than 
under case MIN, but the comparison of total welfare between case MAX and case N is 
determined by RJV formation costs. Even if the firms within an RJV share their information 
c o m p l e t e l y ,  R J V  f o r m a t i o n  i s  n o t  b e n e f i c i a l  f o r  v e r y  h i g h  R J V  f o r m a t i o n  c o s t s  ( w M A X  < W N  
= 4r(A_c)=0(f,r)  _^_^erc,  
2  { 9 y - 2 ( 1  +  0 ? }  ( 9 y - S ) 2  
and Q ( 0 , y )  =  ( 9 y - 4 ) { 9 y - 2 ( l  +  0 ) ( 2 - 0 ) } 2 - { 9 y - ( 2 - 0 ) 2 } ( 9 y - 8 ) 2 .  Since the firms will 
not join in an RJV, government does not have to implement any policy when RJV formation 
costs are very high ( F > Fwc2 )• Recall that the firms will not join in an RJV for sufficiently 
high RJV formation costs ( F > Fvc2 where FvcZ < Fwc2 )• If RJV formation costs are 
sufficiently low ( F < Fvc2 ), the government intervention is also unnecessary because the 
firms will join in an RJV and total welfare is higher under the RJV than under the R&D non-
cooperation. However, if RJV formation costs lie in a median range ( Fvcl < F < Fwcl ), 
government should implement a policy to encourage firms to join in a RJV because total 
welfare is high under the RJV while firms do not prefer joining in a RJV. A possible policy 
may be subsidy on RJV. 
Lemma 5: Suppose spillover costs are sufficiently low, k<kc • Then, a) the government does 
not have to implement any policy for very low or high RJV formation cost ( F < Fvc2 or 
F > Fwc2 ), b) The government should encourage firms to join in a RJV for a moderate value 
of RJV formation cost ( Fvcl < F < Fwc2 )• 
Proof: It is a straightforward result from Lemma 2 and wMAX <=> w" <=> F >=< Fwc2 • 
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Figure 2.5 Welfare comparison and Policy implication ( k  <  k c  )  
Table 2.2 Summary of policy implication 
A. 9  < 1/2  
F < Fvcl '• Intervention (Discourage (tax) RJV) 
F > Fvcl : No intervention (Private and public interests are consistent) 
B.  9  >  1/2  
F < Fvcl : No intervention (Private and public interests are consistent) 
Fvc 1 < F < Fwcl : Intervention (Encourage (subsidy) RJV) 
F > Fwcl : No intervention (Private and public interests are consistent) 
F < Fvc2 : No intervention (Private and public interests are consistent) 
pvc2 <f< p*>c2. intervention (Encourage (subsidy) RJV) 
F > Fwc2 : No intervention (Private and public interests are consistent) 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter considers the problem of R&D competition in the presence of 
spillovers. Unlike most previous studies where spillovers are treated as exogenous, we allow 
spillovers to be determined endogenously. The other important feature in our model is to 
introduce costly RJV formation, which is more reasonable in a real economy as suggested by 
Vilasuso and Frascatore. Two main questions we have asked in this chapter are whether 
firms under the RJV (or R&D cooperation) will choose to share their information completely, 
and whether private interests are consistent with public interests in terms of total welfare. 
Regarding the first question, we showed that the firms under the RJV would achieve 
complete information sharing only if spillover costs are sufficiently low. Meanwhile firms 
under the RJV do not share any information if spillover costs are very high. This result is 
novel in the sense that it was never found in previous studies where a homogenous good and 
Cournot competition in the final market are assumed. Unlike previous studies where they 
suggest that private interests on RJV are consistent with public interests, we also found that 
private interests with an RJV are not consistent with public interests for a wide range of 
parameter values. Thus, we suggest the potential need for active government intervention on 
RJV formation. As seen in previous sections, RJV formation costs, spillover costs, and 
involuntary spillovers are key determinants of which policy government should consider 
when it decides whether to intervene or not. 
The main policy implications are as follows. First, if spillover costs and the degree 
of involuntary spillover are sufficiently high and low, respectively, then the government 
should discourage firms from joining in an RJV for relatively low RJV formation costs while 
no government intervention is necessary for relatively high RJV formation costs. Second, if 
both spillover costs and the degree of involuntary spillover are sufficiently high, then the 
government does not have to implement any policy for very low or high RJV formation 
costs, while government should encourage firms to join in an RJV for a moderate level of 
RJV formation costs. Finally, if spillover costs are sufficiently low, the same results as in the 
second case are obtained, but it is shown that the critical value of RJV formation costs is 
different. 
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There are some possible extensions of this paper. As mentioned earlier, the 
assumption of 'joint profit maximization' under the RJV may be inappropriate, especially 
when the two firms are rivals in the final market. Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate the 
relevancy of the 'joint profit maximization' assumption under an RJV. A second possible 
extension is to consider a case in which firms face Bertrand competition with differentiated 
products in a final market. This may help examine the robustness of the results obtained in 
this paper. A third extension is to introduce initially asymmetric firms. Then, probably we 
may have to find asymmetric outcomes as equilibrium, thus we may obtain a more practical 
policy implication. The last extension is to introduce a research design step and consider 
different research outcomes. This is obviously more realistic and it may help understand the 
role of information sharing. 
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CHAPTER 3. WELFARE EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC SPILLOVERS 
3.1 Introduction 
The Uruguay round established a global agreement on intellectual property, which is 
called TRIPS (Traded-related aspects of intellectual property rights). Under this agreement, 
most developing countries should introduce the international minimum standards of 
protection by 2006. The recent debate in the WTO (World Trade Organization) meeting has 
been whether it is desirable to extend IPR protection to the least developed countries. About 
this issue, the declaration in the Doha round extends the deadline for the least developed 
countries to introduce patent protection on pharmaceuticals until 2016. It seems reasonable in 
the sense that the least developed countries do not have the capacity to absorb new 
knowledge from the innovations while they desperately need the products developed by 
northern firms. 
This chapter examines the welfare effects of intellectual property rights (IPR) 
protection in terms of north-south trade. We ask which southern countries, if any, should 
provide more IPR protection, assuming that the differentiated IPR protection among southern 
countries can be made through a WTO agreement. Yang (1998) showed, using a partial 
equilibrium model, that both the North and the South would be better off if some southern 
countries impose more IPR protection while the others impose less. However, he does not 
identify which southern countries should provide more IPR protection for the northern 
technology.1 
Chin and Grossman (1988), using a duopoly model with one firm from the South 
and the other from the North, compare the welfare effects of IPR protection between two 
regimes: 'full IPR protection' and 'no IPR protection'. They show that the economic interests 
of the North and the South are generally in conflict in the sense that 'no IPR protection' 
benefits the South while it hurts the North. Zigic (1998) extends Chin and Grossman's model 
1 This is because he assumes that all southern countries are identical. 
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by introducing spillovers, which is interpreted as the inverse index of IPR protection. The 
southern firm can take advantage of the benefits from the innovations of northern firm 
through spillovers. By considering only one southern country and a common spillover 
parameter, however, he ignores the fact that the southern countries may face different 
spillovers. In Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen and Levinthal (1989), firms may be different in 
their abilities to absorb or assimilate intra-industry spillovers.2 
We extend Zigic by introducing different spillovers among southern countries to 
examine welfare effects of IPR protection. Only the northern country innovates, and n-1 
southern countries have different capacities to absorb knowledge spillovers from the northern 
innovations.3 We assume, as in Zigic, the abilities to absorb spillovers in any southern 
country decrease (increase) when IPR protection is tightened (relaxed). A two-stage game is 
considered. In the first stage, the northern firm invests in R&D to create the new process. The 
outcome of innovations reduces the unit production cost of northern firm. The technology 
developed by the northern firm provides benefits to the southern firms through spillovers. 
The degree of spillovers is different across southern firms depending on the ability to realize 
knowledge spillovers. In the second stage, all firms engage in Cournot competition. 
The spillover share, which is defined as the spillovers in any country divided by the 
sum of spillovers for all countries, plays a crucial role in determining the welfare effects of 
IPR protection. Some findings obtained in this chapter are as follows. The spillover 
expansion from relaxed IPR protection in any southern country may or may not reduce the 
unit production cost in that country, depending on the spillover share. The profit of the firm 
always increases whenever its unit production cost decreases with spillovers. There is a 
possibility that the profit effect of spillovers is also positive even when it raises unit 
production costs. This happens when the R&D efficiency of the northern firm is sufficiently 
low or if the spillover share is not too big. Meanwhile, the effects of relaxed IPR protection 
in any southern country on aggregate output and consumer surplus are negative as long as the 
2 Cohen and Levinthal (1989) calls this ability 'absorptive capacity'. 
3 In terms of the North, the issue of IPR protection may be 'imitation' of southern countries rather than 
spillovers. Usually, 'imitation' and 'spillovers' are interpreted differently in the sense that 'imitation' is costly 
while 'spillovers' are costless. By different capacity to absorb spillovers, however, we are implicitly 
considering costly spillovers. Thus, the terms 'imitation' and 'spillovers' are interchangeable in this chapter 
even though we prefer 'spillovers', following Zigic. 
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sum of spillovers is relatively large. However, its effects become positive if the sum of 
spillovers is relatively small and the R&D efficiency is very low. 
The welfare effects of spillovers depend on both the consumption share and the 
spillover share. The southern countries can be classified into three groups in terms of welfare 
effects of spillovers. Two critical values of the consumption share, which are quadratic 
functions of the spillover share, play a key role in classifying southern countries into three 
groups. The countries in the first group are better off from relaxed IPR protection both in 
their own countries and in the other countries. The countries in the second group are better 
off from spillovers in their country, but worse off from spillovers in the other group. The 
third group suffers from welfare loss when IPR protection is relaxed in any southern country. 
The northern country is worse off for a wider range of R&D efficiency and the sum of 
spillovers, when the degree of IPR protection decreases in any southern country. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review on 
IPR protection in terms of North-South trade. Section 3 sets up the model and identifies the 
equilibrium while section 4 provides some comparative statics. Section 5 investigates welfare 
effects of spillovers and suggests some implications. The last section provides conclusions. 
3.2 Literature Review 
The literature dealing with the problem of IPR (Intellectual Property Right) 
protection in the context of North-South trade has not reached any consensus until now. Chin 
and Grossman (1988) seem to be the first to contribute to this issue. Using a duopoly model 
with one firm from the South and the other from the North, they compare the welfare effects 
of IPR protection between two regimes: full IPR protection and no IPR protection. They 
show that the economic interests of the North and the South are generally in conflict in the 
sense that the South benefits from 'no IPR protection' while it hurts the North. Diwan and 
Rodrik (1991) argue northern and southern countries generally have different preferences for 
technology. They model the 'appropriate technology' for southern countries, and suggest that 
southern countries can benefit from IPR protection. Deardorff (1992) argues that, when IPR 
protection increases, the North is always benefited while the South is hurt, and emphasizes 
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that the effect on world welfare will be negative if IPR protection is extended to all southern 
countries. Helpman (1993) suggests that tightening IPR protection hurts both North and 
South in the presence of slow imitation while it benefits only the North when the imitation 
rate is high. He also points out that higher protection of IPR by the South could lead to slow 
innovation of northern firms, partly because of the lack of competition. 
Zigic (1998) extends Chin and Grossman's model by introducing technological 
spillovers to examine the role of IPR protection when only the northern firm conducts 
innovative activity. The degree of spillovers is interpreted as an indicator of the inverse 
strength of IPR protection. He shows that the South may benefit from tightening IPR 
protection through the spillover effect of the increased northern firm's R&D investment. 
Given that innovation should be protected for sufficient innovations of the northern firm, the 
conflict may be enlarged across southern countries in the sense that each southern country 
has an incentive to wait for other southern countries to provide more protection. Yang (1998) 
suggests that the cooperation for IPR protection among some southern countries will make 
mutual gains to both North and South. The remaining question is which southern countries 
should provide more IPR protection. 
3.3 The Model and Equilibrium 
3.3.1 The Model 
There exist n  countries in the world market: one northern country (labeled by 1) and 
n-1 southern countries (labeled by 2,3,....,»). We assume that there exist at least four 
southern countries.4 Thus, n> 5. Each country has only one firm. All innovations take place 
in the northern country, which conducts R&D. By the spillover effect, n-1 southern countries 
can partly appropriate the knowledge generated by the northern country, depending on their 
knowledge absorptive abilities and the IPR protection level. Both North and South have 
access to an old technology to produce a good demanded in the world market. 
4 We may think that southern countries can be classified into two groups, and each group consists of at least two 
countries. This may help identify which countries, if any, should cooperate to provide more IPR protections. 
H o w e v e r ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  o b t a i n e d  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  h o l d  f o r  n>3 .  
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The northern firm has the following unit production cost function, which is 
1/2  
originally used by Chin and Grossman (1988): Ci = &-(}>%) » where a describes pre-
innovation cost, and y is a parameter denoting the R&D efficiency. The term, (y%)1'2, 
represents the R&D production function, which exhibits diminishing returns to scale with 
respect to R&D investment, z • 5 The ith southern firm's unit cost function is 
1 /2  
C i  =  ( X ~ ,  i  = 2,3, n  where j 3 i € (0,1) denotes the index of spillovers or the 
strength of inverse IPR protection as in Zigic (1998). It may be reasonable to think that the 
spillover parameter consists of two terms: IPR protection level and country-specific 
characteristic. The country-specific characteristic may include the country's ability to absorb 
R&D knowledge,6 or it may reflect imitation ability. Thus, even if southern countries face 
common IPR protection level, the value of the spillover parameter may be different across 
southern countries, depending on the ability to absorb R&D knowledge (or imitation ability). 
We assume that the southern country 2 has the highest ability to realize R&D knowledge 
while southern country n has the least ability: 7 a > a > > p , thus 
C2 < Ci < < Cn • We assume away two extreme cases, /? = 0 and /?, = 1, which may 
reflect 'perfect protection' and 'no protection' of intellectual property right, respectively.8 
Note that /?, = 1 in our set-up. It is straightforward to show that the sum of 
spillovers is less than the number of countries in the market, i.e., £/?<«. The consumers 
7=1 
are identical, and country z" s consumers consume Q. e [0,1] proportion of total demand, 
5 For more detail, see D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992). 
6 Following Cohen and Levinthal (1989), we may call this ability 'absorptive capacity'. 
7 It may be possible for each southern country to increase the amount of spillovers by making some efforts to 
increase 'absorptive capacity' as well as from relaxed IPR protection. Thus, introducing endogenous spillovers 
may be an interesting issue to tackle, but beyond this chapter. We assume throughout this chapter that the 
spillover expansion in any southern country takes place only when IPR protection is relaxed. 
8 Even if IPR protection is perfect ( /?, = 0 ), the value of spillover parameter may not be zero, i.e., f$. > 0, as 
long as we assume that the spillover parameter takes a strongly separate form, i.e., fii = /?. + *y,, where p i  
and (Oi denote inverse IPR protection level and country's ability to absorb knowledge, respectively. One thing 
to note is the results obtained in this chapter do not hold if the value of spillover parameter takes zero, i.e., 
Pt = 0. 
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which is given as a linear inverse demand function: P =  A -Q,  Q =  Y ,q i -  Here, A is 
sufficiently large to exceed a (A > a) so that it guarantees an interior equilibrium, q. 
represents the final production of each country. 
Assumption h (1) There exists at least four southern countries in the market, n-1>4 or 
n > 5. (2)pi>p2 > p3 > > , where /?, = !, /?, e (0,1) i - 2,3,...., n. 
Lemma 1: Let = pj ILP, be the spillover share of country i. Then, by Assumption 1, 
si>lln, Sn < II n, and Si <1/2 where, i = 2,3, n. 
Proof) jffjsl, £ , f ï j <n,  'Z f i j >np n , thus S i>Vn ,  Jn<l/n. j=i ;=i 
For i = 2.3, », s, - A/Ê < A A1+< A/2 A =1 /2 • ;=i 
3.3.2 Equilibrium 
The game among » countries consists of two stages, and the nature of the 
equilibrium is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In the first stage, the northern country 
chooses R&D investment, %. In the second stage, given the northern firm's R&D investment, 
the n firms engage in Coumot-Nash competition. To find the subgame perfect equilibrium, 
we first solve for the Nash equilibrium in the second stage and then work backwards solving 
for the first stage R&D level. In the second stage, each firm maximizes its profit: 
TCi - P(Q)q. - ciqi for all i  - 1 ,  n  . The first order condition of any country i  is 
a  -  Q -  q . -C t  =  0  for all i  =  1 ,  n  . Solving the first order condition for n  firm 
simultaneously, we get the following Cournot outcome as function of R&D investment: 
n n n 
A
~"c,+Zc, A +Zcy  """Zc, 
(1) Q
'— r^~ 
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In the first stage, given the second stage outcome, the northern firm chooses % to 
maximize its profit (including R&D cost): 
(A-nc+Ë cy) [A-Mfe-W'l+g ^ W )] 
( 2 > y
'
=  («+; ^  * 
The first order condition is: 
2 
.1/2 -1/2 {(A - or)(» +1 - Z +1 - Z /} 
(3) J- :  ^ 1 = 0 
(n +1)2 
-{(A-arXn + l - i^)/^-^} 
The second order condition is J—^z <0 for all y >0. 
2(n + lf 
From the first order condition, we obtain the equilibrium R&D investment. 
)W 
, 2  .  2 ,  
(4) £ = ^ , where9 A =  n  +  l - f l ^ j >0 
{(n  +  1)  - yA  }  
As seen in equation (4), the equilibrium R&D investment becomes infinite at a level 
2 
of large R&D efficiency. To avoid this situation, we assume y <y = ^ +2^ . Replacing the 
A 
final production with the equilibrium R&D investment, % , yields: for i  =  2,3, n  
(A-a){(n + l)-y(l-A)A) md for the northem f + por al, 
(n + l)2->A2 1 (n + l?-yA2 
countries to produce positive amounts, y  <  y"  =  + ^ is required, which is equivalent to 
the condition for southern country n  to produce. This condition guarantees that all countries 
produce positive amounts because the output of the southern country n is smallest. 
9 Henceforth, this expression, A = n + 1 — 2/?,>0,is assumed to hold. 
M 
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We may need to restrict the upper bound of R&D efficiency more since y" depends 
on the spillover parameter, . Since yn has the smallest value when fin is closest to zero, 
the appropriate condition for n-firm oligopoly existence in the world market will be: 
(5) y <y" = (n + 1)/A where, y < y, y". 
For the later use, we define market share for each country with Zk - qjQ • 
Definition 1: Let zk = qjQ be market share for any country k .  Then, Z k  = À  +  r] s k ,  where 
It may be desirable to compare the condition for n-firm oligopoly in our model with 
that for the duopoly to exist both in Chin and Grossman (1988) and Zigic (1998). The 
condition for the duopoly to exist in Chin and Grossman and Zigic are y <312 and 
y < 3/{(l-/?)(2-/?)}, respectively. Two countries, the North and the South, are modeled in 
both papers. Chin and Grossman consider 'perfect protection' of intellectual property right 
while Zigic assumes that southern country can take advantage of the benefits from northern 
firm's innovation through spillovers. The condition in Chin and Grossman can be recovered 
in our set-up by setting n=2 and /?2 = 0 while Zigic's condition is obtained by putting n=2 and 
Both Chin and Grossman and Zigic consider two more types of equilibria: monopoly 
and strategic prédation. They show that the northern firm will enjoy the pure monopoly 
position for a sufficiently high value of R&D efficiency parameter (y) while it will act 
strategically to induce southern firm's exit (strategic prédation) for an intermediate value of 
R&D efficiency. These two types of equilibria can exist when there is more than one 
(n + 1) - yA 
> 0 ,  r] = J- > 0  
n(n +1) - yA(A -1) n{n +1) - ?A(A -1) 
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southern country in the world. The monopoly condition10 in our set-up is y  >  -——. The 
same condition for the monopoly is obtained in Zigic where only one southern country is 
assumed. Note y> 2 is the condition for the monopoly in Chin and Grossman where they 
consider perfect protection of intellectual property right ( ft = 0 ). The condition for strategic 
prédation is 3/2 < y <2 and 3/{ (1 - j3)(2 -/?)} < y< 2/(1 -/?) in Chin and Grossman and 
Zigic, respectively. In our set-up, (n  +  l ) j { ( I - J3 2 ) (n  +1 -£/?,)}<y<2/(1-^) is the 
condition for strategic prédation, which is exactly the same condition as in Zigic if we 
assume that there exists only one southern country in the market.11 Even though the outcome 
comparison among these equilibria is an interesting issue, we do not consider these two 
equilibria since we are interested in investigating the own and cross welfare effects of 
spillovers in the southern country. 
3.4 Comparative statics 
The spillover expansion of southern countries (from relaxed IPR protection) lowers 
northern firm's R&D investment since it reduces the northern firm's incentive to invest in 
R&D, that is, + + V A  } < q 2 is a straightforward result 
l(«+i)2V} 
and it is useful for the later analysis of welfare effects. The spillover elasticity of R&D 
investment (e&) is bigger for southern countries with higher spillover share ( Sk ), which 
implies that the northern firm reacts more sensitively to the spillover expansion in southern 
countries with higher spillover share. 
10 This happens when 'drastic innovation' takes place, that is, for i  = 2, , n ,  p"  <  C i (Z ") where m 
denotes monopoly outcome. Substituting price and R&D with monopoly outcome yields the condition. 
11 The equilibrium R&D investment for strategic prédation can be obtained by setting qt = 0 for 
i = 2 n . 
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Definition 2: Let exk = -(ft k/%)(<$%ft Pk) be the spillover (fik) elasticity of R&D investment, 
2sk XPj{(n +1)2 + yA2} 
Then, for k = 2,3, ,n, = — > 0 
Lemma 2: a) Suppose £/? > (n + l)/2 . Then, £ x k > 2 S k .  b) Suppose <(n  +  l ) I2  .  M j=1 
rt 
Then sXk >=< 2 s* <=> y >=< 7cl, where 7e1 = (A - y5;)(n +1) / A2 < 1 
M 
Proof) It is a straightforward result from the expression of spillover elasticity in Definition 2. 
The spillover expansion of any southern country k raises the equilibrium unit 
production cost of other countries including the northern country because it reduces the 
northern firm's incentive to invest in R&D (dCi/dfik >0). Whether it decreases its own unit 
production cost depends on its spillover share ($*). If the spillover share in any southern 
country k  is relatively high ( s k>  s c l  ), the spillover expansion through relaxed IPR protection 
raises its unit production cost. The northern firm's reaction to the spillover expansion is more 
sensitive when spillovers increase in the southern country with higher spillover share. Thus, 
the direct effect of spillover on unit cost in the southern country with relatively high spillover 
share is dominated by the indirect effect of the decreased R&D investment. The critical value, 
(n  +  l f (2A- y ^ i P j )  
scl, is smaller (bigger) than 1/2 for y > ycl (y< yc2 ), where12 yc2 = . 
A2 (2A+ £/<?,) 
j=1 
Note, by Assumption 1, the spillover share in any southern country should be less than 1/2 . 
Therefore, the spillover expansion in any southern country always decreases its unit 
production costs if R&D efficiency is sufficiently low ( y < yc2 ). Also, the critical value, /', 
1 2  / 2 < 0=>  /  <1 /2  for  (n>)±p .>  2(n  + 1)/3. 
M 
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may be smaller or bigger than l/(n+l), depending on the R&D efficiency. If the R&D 
(n  +1) 2  { (n  +1)A  -  ^  Pj}  
efficiency is relatively low ( y  <y c 3 ,  where13 yc3 = ), is bigger 
A2{(« + 1)A + J^.} 
M 
than l/(n+l) while it is smaller than l/(n+l) for relatively high R&D efficiency ( y > y c 3 ) .  
This implies that the range of southern countries, in which cost reduction occurs from 
spillover expansion, widens if the R&D efficiency is relatively low. This is intuitively 
obvious because the direct effect of spillovers on unit production costs will dominate the 
indirect effect of the decreased R&D investment of northern firm if R&D efficiency is 
sufficiently low. 
Lemma 3: For i = 1,2,...., n, k = 2 ,....,n, and k*i, (a) dCi/d/3k > 0 
(b) dCk/d/3k >=< 0 <=> sk >=< scl, where Z1 = + —7A_}_ 
i=i 
^ w  t = f  w r - ^ h > 0  s i n c e  
IK - >=< o « ,„ >=< 2 
Replacing £# with the expression in Definition 2 yields dCk/dj3k >=< 0 <=> sk >=< scl • 
The final output in any southern country increases whenever the spillover expansion 
yields the reduction of its unit production cost (dCk/d/3k < 0 =>dqk/d/3k > 0 ). As seen in 
Equation (6), the own effect of spillovers on output can be determined by two effects: the 
own and the cross effect on unit production costs. Since the cross effect of spillover on unit 
13 yc3 >yn => scl > I/O +1) for o >)£/? , > (n2 -1 )/n. j=i 
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production costs is always positive (dCj/d/3k> 0), it is obvious that the own effect of 
spillover on output is positive as long as its own effect on unit production cost is negative. 
Recall that the cost reduction by own spillover expansion occurs only for the southern 
countries with relatively low spillover share ( sk < scl )• 
(6) dqk _ -n dCk , 1 "vdCj 
_ ^ — > K 2,...., TI , j 1,2,...., n. 
n  + 1 d B , .  dPk n + ld/3k   lj£dj3k 
Interestingly, there is a case where the final output of the firm increases even when 
its unit costs increase with spillover expansion, that is, dCk/d/3k > Oand dqJdPk > 0. This 
happens if the cross effect of spillover on unit production costs dominates its own effect, i.e., 
\ndCk/dP\ T<iCj/dPt j*k / 
. The size of own spillover effect on unit production cost is larger 
for southern countries with higher spillover share. This is due to the fact that the northern 
firm reacts more sensitively to the spillover expansion in the southern country with higher 
spillover share (d£&/dsk> 0 ). Thus, there exists a critical value, /2(> /') , which 
determines whether the output increases with spillovers, i.e., dqkjdpk >=< 0 <=> Sk <=> /2. 
The firms in southern countries with the spillover share ^ e (/2,l/2) suffer from the higher 
unit cost and the production reduction ( dCk/df}k > 0 and dqjdf3k< 0) while southern 
countries with the spillover share Sk g (/\/2) experience dCk/d/3k > 0 and dqk/dfik > 0. 
The critical value of the spillover share, /2, also depends on the level of R&D 
efficiency. /2 is greater than both l/(n+l) and /' for the range of R&D efficiency we 
consider in this chapter, i.e., 0 < y < y". Meanwhile, if R&D efficiency is sufficiently low 
(n+l)2{2»(" +1) - (3 n -1)É 
(y<Yc\ where14 yc4 = ), the critical value, /2, is greater 
A2{2 n(n +1) - (n + l)Xy6.) 
M 
than 1/2, i.e., /2> 1/2. Therefore, the spillover expansion in any southern country always 
14 yc4 <0=> sc2 <1/2 for (n >)tpf > 2n(n + l)/(3n-l) 
>i 
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yields the increased production of its firm, regardless of the change in unit production costs, 
if the R&D efficiency is sufficiently low ( y < ycA ) (see Figure 1). 
The spillover expansion in any southern country k always raises unit production 
costs of the other southern countries ( dCi/dPk >0). Nevertheless, the final output in those 
countries may increase, depending on the size of spillover effects on unit production costs. 
Equation (7) analyzes the cross spillover effect on output (dqjd/3k): 
(7) A_= dc' +J —Y É £l + 1  dc\ i = k = 2,....,n, i*k. 
dfik n + 1 dpk n + lj*i<kdfik n +1 d/3k 
The first term on the right hand side has a negative sign while the sign of the second 
term is positive. The sign of the third term is negative (positive) for southern countries with 
the spillover share, $k < scl ( Sk> scl )• Thus, we cannot determine the sign of dqjdfik 
without further analysis. Replacing each term with the results in Lemma 3 yields an 
interesting result (see Lemma 4). The important factor to determine the sign of dqjd/3k is 
the spillover share of southern country i ( Si )• Technically, we can get the spillover share, /°, 
which is a critical value to determine whether changes in spillovers in any given southern 
country increase or decrease outputs in the other countries. Country Vs output increases with 
spillover expansion in any southern country k only if its own spillover share is sufficiently 
low (si < /°). The critical value /° is always smaller than l/(n+l) and /' as well as /2 for 
0<y<y". Obviously, the output of the northern firm, whose spillover share is greater than 
1/n, decreases when the degree of IPR protection is lowered in any southern country. One 
thing to note is that /° becomes negative if £/? . < (n + l)/2 and y < ycl(< 1). If this occurs, 
7=1 
then country i's output always decreases with spillover expansion in any southern country k. 
Lemma 4: a) for k = 2,....,n, dqjdfik >=< 0 <=> sk <=> scl 
(%A + Ê (n + if - r M ' Z 
where, sc2 = — — 
Zyg,(n + l){(n + lf + y^} 
7=1 
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b) for i -1 , 2 n ,  k = 2, and i ï k, dqJdPk >=< 0 <=> $i <=> s 
Œ^-A)0+if+yA'(»+l) 
where, /" = — 
Z^(» + l){(n + ir  + XA'} 
m 
c) dQ/dfik < 0 if X/?. > (n + 1)/2. dQ/d/3k <=> 0 <=> y >=< if £1, < (n + 1)/2 
>1 _/'=! 
- — Ê^{2"^ + —^{(^ + l)^~l}= [2n^-{(n + l)^-l}^] 
20+%^"^ 2(»+i),/  
Since e x k >0,  dq jd /3 k  > 0 if Sk < l/(n +1) 
However, if Sk > 1 A> +1), dqjd/3k >=< 0<=> g# <=> 2nSk/{(n +1)S k  ~  1} 
Replacing exk with the expression in Definition 2 yields dqj dfik >=< 0 <=> sk <=> scl where 
sc2 <=> ^  <=> Y >=< yc3. Note that the critical value, /2, is always greater than l/(n+l). 
- —- -[{(« +1)5,-1}—^-2f.] = [{(n +1)5,.-l}^ + 2 s*] 2(M + l)j* ' 2(n + l)^ 
Since £ x k >0,  dqJd fS k  <0 if Sk > l/(n +1) 
However, if Si < l/(n +1), dqjdpk >=< 0 ^ >=< 2Si/{1 -(n + 1) j,} 
Replacing exk with the expression in Definition 2 yields dqjd/3k >=< 0 <=> Si <=> /° 
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42_ w ,  %  
dPk n +1 n + lj?x 1 2 d/?t 
Replacing with the expression in Definition 2 yields the result (see Lemma 2). 
( a ) / : < r < r  (b) 
^Zi<0! 
dPk 
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Figure 3.1 Spillover effects on the unit cost and final production 15 
15 yc3 > ycA > ycl (> ycl). These four graphs are drawn for a wider range of the sum of spillovers. But there is 
a case where we need only graph (b) if the sum of spillovers is sufficiently big (see footnote 12,13, and 14). 
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Finally, the effect of relaxed DPR protection in any southern country on aggregate output is 
analyzed in Equation (8): 
-
Since the second term on the right hand side is negative, aggregate output always decreases 
as long as the spillover expansion from relaxed IPR protection take place in a southern 
country k with spillover share, su > /', where its unit cost increases with spillovers 
(dCkld/3k >0). When the degree of IPR protection is lowered in southern country k with a 
spillover share, Sk < , the spillover effect on aggregate output will be positive only if its 
own effect on unit cost dominates the effect on unit costs of the other countries, that is, 
spillovers is relatively small, and R&D efficiency is sufficiently low, technically, 
£/?,< (n + l)/2,  y < Yc\< Yc2) • Under this condition, the output increases with spillovers j=i 
in the southern country where spillovers take place, but decreases in the other countries. 
Note that the critical value of the spillover share, /", is negative under this condition (Case 2 
in Table 1), which implies that the output in any southern country i, i^k, decreases with 
spillovers in southern country k. Also, the critical values of the spillover share, /' and /2, 
are bigger than Vz under this condition, which implies that the own spillover effect on unit 
production costs is negative while the own spillover effect on output is positive. We can 
summarize the spillover effects on aggregate output with the following two cases. 
Table 3.1 Spillover effects on aggregate output 
Spillover effect Condition for parameters 
Case 1 42/4% <0 £/?.  >(n+l)/2 or Zyg <(n + l)/2,  y > y c l  
M J=i 
Case 2 42/4% >0 <(n + l) /2,y</ 
M 
We show in Lemma 4 that this case happens only if the sum of 
i*k 
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3.5 Welfare effects 
In this section, we investigate the effect of spillovers (or IPR protection) on 
domestic welfare for each country. The welfare consists of firm's profits and consumer 
surplus for each country. The welfare of the northern country is defined by 
Wi = Vi + û\CS = 7Ti~Z + 0\CS, where CS represents total consumer surplus. The welfare 
of southern country i is defined by W, = 7ii + <9,CS, i = The equilibrium consumer 
surplus and firms' profits in the final market for country i, are given by CS, = 0iQ212 and 
7ti = <?,2, respectively. Thus, the signs of the effects of spillovers on consumer surplus and 
profit are equivalent to the signs of the effects on aggregate outputs and individual output, 
respectively (see Lemma 5). 
Lemma 5: for i = l,2,....,n, k = 2 , and i^k, 
(a) dCSk/dfik = 0k Q (dQ / 3 f i k ) ,  dCS jd /3 k  = <9, Q(dQId/3k) 
(b) dTlk!d(3k = 2qk(dqk!d fik), d7ri/dfik = 2qi(dqi/d0k). 
Proof) It is a straightforward result from CS, = (9, Q 2 / 2  and m = q[ .  
3.5.1 Northern country 
The northern firm's incentive to invest in R&D decreases when IPR protection is 
relaxed in any southern country. The northern firm's unit cost increases, and this effect 
dominates the effect of the decreased R&D cost on its profit 
(^[Kl = —2/(A—a) A < q £ _ 2 M ). The sign of the spillover effect on aggregate output 
{(M+iy-ra2} 
is equivalent to that of its effect on consumer surplus, i.e., 
dQ/dfib < => 0 <=> dCS/d/3k < => 0. Therefore, under the condition of Case 1 the consumers 
in the northern country are hurt (dCS\/dfik <0), thus relaxed IPR protection in any southern 
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country hurts the northern country ( dWi/d/3k <0 ).16 Even when its consumer surplus 
increases with spillovers in any southern country (Case 2), only in a very restricted range the 
northern country will make welfare gains. We can find a critical value of the consumption 
share, Q\, such that the northern country experiences welfare gains (loss) with spillovers in 
any southern country k for Qx > (<9, < Unless R&D efficiency is close to zero and 
the sum of spillovers is very low, however, 0* is larger than one, which implies that the 
northern country is hurt when IPR protection is relaxed in any southern country. 
3.5.2 Southern countries 
For any southern country k, the spillover expansion from relaxed IPR protection has 
a positive effect on the profits of its firm only if its spillover share is relatively small (i.e., 
d7[kldf}k >0 <=> Sk< sc2 ). This is because the output increases with spillovers in these 
countries ( dqk/dfik > 0 <=> ^ < /2 )• One thing to note is that the unit production cost 
decreases with spillovers in the countries with the spillover share, Sk< scl(< sc2), while it 
increases if the spillover share is relatively big ( Sk> scl )• In this sense, the spillover 
expansion may be more favorable for the countries with a spillover share, Sk < /' • 
Meanwhile, relaxed IPR protection makes the firms less competitive if they are located in 
southern countries with a spillover share, sk > /2, in the sense that their profits decrease with 
increased spillovers (i.t.,d^k/dj8k < 0 <=>$*> /2). Recall that the critical value, /2, is larger 
than ¥z as long as the R&D efficiency is sufficiently low ( y < y c 4 ). If this case happens, then 
the spillover expansion in any southern country always yields the increased production (thus 
profits) of its firm (see Figure 1). 
16 Zigié (1998) shows that the northern country is always hurt with spillovers in the southern country, especially 
when the duopoly turns out to be the market structure. 
{(A — J3 j ) (n  +1) - yA2} {n(n +1) - )A(A -1)}, 
M 
lim<9f = 2V"(A/?y)>l for (n + l)(n-2)/2(n —1)< < (n + l)/2.  
r-* o / j=\ j=l 
17 0\ - [2A{(n +1) ~ ?A }]/ 
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On the other hand, the cross effect of spillovers on profits is positive only for the 
country with a sufficiently low spillover share, i.e., drti!d/3k > 0 <=> j, < /°(< 1 l(n +1)). The 
output in these countries increases, when IPR protection is relaxed in any southern country, 
even though their unit production costs also increase. The intuition is that these countries 
become relatively competitive because the increased amount of unit costs is small compared 
to the countries with a larger spillover share, & > /° , i.e., 
0 < dCild(3k (Si < sc0) < dCi/d/3k (Si > sc0), i*k. However, the critical value, /°, is negative 
if both the degree of spillovers and R&D efficiency are sufficiently low (under Case 2: 
n . 
< (n + l)/2 and y< yc ), which implies that the profits in any southern country i 
M 
decrease with spillovers in southern country k ,  k ï i .  
Consumers are hurt when the degree of IPR protection decreases in any southern 
country unless both the sum of spillovers and R&D efficiency are sufficiently low (that is, 
under Case 1). The spillover expansion in any southern country k reduces the northern firm's 
incentive to invest in R&D, which consequently has a dominant effect on aggregate output. 
In southern country k with the spillover share sk < scl and in southern countries with spillover 
share st < sc0, the output increases with increased spillovers in southern country k. But, in the 
northern country and the southern countries with spillover share s, > /°, the output falls with 
spillovers in southern country k, and southern country k with the spillover share sk > sc2 also 
suffers from output reduction. Under the condition of Case 1, the latter effect on aggregate 
output dominates the former effect, i.e., dQ/dPk < 0. Meanwhile, there is a case where 
consumers make gains with increased spillovers in any southern country (Case 2). This is a 
little bit interesting because the output decreases under the condition of Case 2 in all 
countries except one country where spillovers take place. The intuition is that the northern 
firm's reaction to relaxed IPR protection in any southern country is less sensitive if the sum 
of spillovers is relatively small. Thus, the spillover effect dominates the effect of the 
decreased R&D investment on unit costs in southern country spillovers take place. So, unit 
costs in southern country spillovers take place decrease while its output increases. 
Meanwhile, the increased amount of unit costs in the other countries becomes small because 
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the degree of R&D efficiency is sufficiently low. Thus, the decreased output in these 
countries is also relatively small. Consequently, the output increase in the southern country 
where spillovers take place, dominates the output fall  in the other countries (dQ/d(3 k  >0). 
Lemma 6: For i = 1,2,....,n, k = 2,....,n, and i * k 
(a) d7tk/dPk >-< 0 <=> sk <=> sc2, dfti!d/3k >=< 0 <=> Si <=> /° 
c) dCSk/dfik <0, dCSt/dj3k< 0 if t /3 ,>(n + l)/2.  
>i 
dCS kjdfik <—> 0, dCS Jdfik <=> 0 4=> y >=< y if ^ fi^  < (n +1) / 2 ;=1 
Proof) It is straightforward to show the results from Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. 
The spillover effect on domestic welfare depends on both the consumption share and 
the spillover share. There exist two cases to be analyzed. First, suppose that aggregate output 
decreases with spillovers in any southern country (Case 1). Then, consumers are hurt when 
IPR protection is relaxed in any southern country. It is straightforward to show that the 
southern countries with spillover share, Sk > /2, are worse off by relaxed IPR protection 
( dWk/dfik= dxk/d0k + dCSk/d/3k<0 ) because the firm is also hurt (d7Tk/dfik< 0 ). 
Meanwhile, the profit gains in southern countries with relatively low spillover share 
(sk< sc2 ) come at the expense of consumers. Thus, welfare effect of spillovers in these 
countries depends on the consumption share (0k)- The critical value of the consumption 
share, 0e1 (sk) = (M ~0Sk)(A + Vsd, which is a quadratic function of the spillover share, plays 
a crucial role in analyzing the own spillover effect on domestic welfare. If the consumption 
share is relatively small ($k < 0c\sk) X the spillover expansion benefits southern countries. 
The critical value of spillover share, 0e1 (sk), decreases with spillover share Sk, which 
reflects the fact that the profit gains from spillovers are largest in the country with the lowest 
spillover share. Note that it is possible to have //A > 1 as y—> 0, which implies that southern 
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countries with very low spillover share are always better off from spillovers regardless of the 
consumption share.18 
On the other hand, it is obvious that any southern country i with the spillover share, 
Si  >  s c 0 ,  i s  wor se  o f f  (dWi /d f i k  < 0)  when  IPR  p ro t ec t ion  i s  r e l axed  i n  sou the rn  coun t ry  k ,  
k ï i because both the firm and the consumers are hurt. For southern countries with the 
spillover share, si < sc0, however, welfare effect depends on the consumption share. Note 
that the profits in these countries increase with spillovers in any given southern country. The 
critical value of the consumption share, 0cO = (2 - 0 s,)(/l + rj Sl) , plays a key role in 
examining the cross welfare effects. If consumption share is relatively big (<9, > 0cO(si) ), 
compared to the spillover share, the other southern countries are worse off by relaxed IPR 
protection in any southern country k. That is, profit gains for these countries are 
overwhelmed by the decreased consumer surplus. 
Lemma 6: For i = 1,2,...., n, k = 2,....,«, i * k 
(a) Under Case 1, dWk/d/3k >=< 0 <=> #* <=> 0cl = sk)(^ + V sù, V, 0, A, T] > 0 
Under  Case  2 ,  dWk/d /3 k  >=< 0  &  >=<  6 c l  = {p i~<P s k )U  +  Vsk ) ,  A,^<0 ,  A,r ]>0  
2[(«A + £ P } )  (n  +1)2 - y  A2 (nA - £&)] 2 (n  +1 ) tPA{n  +1)2 + ZA2} 
^ S-
(X Pj ~ A) (n +1)2 + y(n +1) A2 Œ P} - A) (n +1)2 + y(n +1) A2 i=i y=i 
(b) Under Case 1, dPk >=< 0 <=> di <=> 0cO = (2-0 sdU + 7 s,) 
Under Case 2, dWi/dPk >=< 0 <=> >=< <9c0 = (2-<pSi)(A + r j S i )  
^ < a ) f f = 2 ? ' tH 0 f ;  
lim/ll = 2(nA + 2;,lA)/"Œ"„A-A)>lf«(" + 1»/2<EMA<3"<" + 1)/(4"-1)' 18 r-»o' 
We do not consider this case in Figure 2 since it holds in a very restricted range of R&D efficiency. Meanwhile, 
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(w) 1 / 2  ( y r f 2  
- 2qk— —[2ns k - { (n  +  l ) s k - l}£XK] + 0kQ n—(^SK~^XK) 2(n +1) st 2(n + l)s* 
(yyf2 
= qk~Z} Z — t 4 n -  2 { ( n  + 1 ) S t  - 1 } f d  +  n ( 2 S t  -
A" + l)st 
(yy)U2 
= 9t%: %—t2 st (2n + T k ) -{2(» + l)st-2 + Tt) £xk\ 
2{n +1) Sk 
Since £#>0 ,  dWk/dj3k > 0 if tk < 2 - 2(n +1) Sk 
If tk > 2 - 2(n + l)st, (fWt/>=< 0<=> f/t <=> 2Sk (2« + rt) /[n + 2{(n +1) st~l}] 
Using Definition 2 for and replacing rk with tk = 6k/zk and Zk = qjQ = A + rjsk yields 
the result. 
( yy ) v 2  (VY) 1 ' 2  
= ~ 
2^i , n [2 st + {(" +1) s,- ~ 1} f,t] + A 6 , (2 sk-£xk) 
2 (n +1) st 2 (n +1) st 
- ~ <?t ~Z}—t:— [4 Sk + 2{ (n +1) s, -1} £^t ~ rt (2 st ~ O] 
2(n + l) st 
( yy ) 1 / 2  
= ~<lkir, —[2 Sk (2 - Ti) + {2(n +1) s,- - 2 + f,} 
2(n +1) st 
We examine the sign of dW J d/3k with three cases. 
First, if 0 < r, < 2 and r,- > 2 - 2  (n  +1) S i ,  dW, /d f i k  < 0 since £#>0. 
Second, if 0< r, < 2 and n  <2-2 (n  +1)s,,  
dWi/dfik >=< 0 <=> s# >=< 2(2 - n) st /{2 - r; ~ 2(n +1) s,} 
we can show that A is always less than 1/n while // is less than n for most ranges of R&D efficiency that we 
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Rearranging yields dWi/dfik  >=< 0 <=> n <=> 2 -</>Si 
Third, if r, > 2, dfik >=< 0 <=> r, <=> 2-</>Si 
Finally, replacing r, with r, = Oil z i  and Z i  =  q t /Q  =  A  +  r}  S i  yields the result, 
( a )  X e 4  <  /  <  y "  ( b )  0 < y <  f 4  
R3 R3 
R4 
R2 R2 
R1 R1 
l/(n + l)  y 1/2 !/(% + !) 1/2 
Rl: dWk/dj8k > 0 , d7tk/dPk  > 0 , dCSk/dfik < 0 ; dWi/dpk  > 0 
R2: dWk/dPk > 0, d7tk/dPk > 0, dCSk/dpk < 0 ; dWi/dPk < 0 
R3: dWk/dPk < 0, d7ik/dPk > 0, dCSk/dPk < 0 ; dWi/dpk < 0 
R4: dWk/dPk < 0, d7Tkldpk < 0, dCSk/dPk < 0 ; dWjdPk < 0 
Figure 3.2 Welfare effects of spillovers under Case l19 
Second, suppose that aggregate output increases with spillovers in any southern 
country (Case 2). Then, consumers make gains when IPR protection is relaxed in any 
southern country. It is straightforward to show that the southern countries with the spillover 
consider. Also, note that all parameters (JU,0,A,T}) are positive under Case 1. 
19 Figure 2 is drawn for £ P > (n +1) / 2. However, it also holds for ]£/? .< (ft+ 1)/2 and y > ycl 
M j=i 
except that the lower bound of R&D efficiency is ycl (not zero) in Figure 2 (b). 
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share, $k < scl, are better off ( dWk/dfik > 0 ) by relaxed IPR protection because the firm also 
makes gains ( d7ik/dPk > 0 ). The interesting thing is that under the condition of Case 2 there 
does not exist the southern country whose spillover share is bigger than /2, which means the 
own spillover effect on profits is always positive regardless of the spillover share. This is 
obvious technically since the critical value, /2, is bigger than 1/2, but the spillover share in 
any country should be less than 1/2. The economic intuition is, as long as both the sum of 
spillovers and R&D efficiency are sufficiently low, the northern firm is not much sensitive to 
the spillovers in any southern country. Thus, the direct spillover effect on its unit production 
costs dominates the reduced R&D investment effect. Since the output of the southern country 
always increase whenever its unit production costs decrease, as we showed earlier, the profit 
increases with spillovers in any southern country. 
G 
1 
,c0 
R2 
l/(n+ 1) 1/2 c2 S 
Rl: dWk/dj3k > 0, dnk/dpk > 0, dCSk/dpk > 0 ;  dWi/dfik > 0 
R2: dWk/dj3k > 0, dnk/dfik > 0, dCSk/dj3k > 0 ; dWi/dj3k < 0 
Figure 3.3 Welfare effects of spillovers under Case 2 
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On the other hand, under the condition of Case 2 the profits in any southern country 
i always decrease when IPR protection is relaxed in southern country k, k^i.20However, 
there exist some southern countries that they are better off with spillovers in any given 
southern country (dWi/d/3k> 0) if their consumption shares are sufficiently high, i.e., 
6i > 0cO = (2 - (f> Si)(A + r] sd .21 This is because the gains from consumers dominate the loss of 
the firm in these countries (see Figure 3). 
3.5.3 Net trade effects of spillovers 
In section 3.4, we showed that both the consumption and the production in each 
country change with spillovers in any southern country k. Country z's consumption is a 
portion (#, ) of aggregate output. Thus, the direction of the spillover effect on consumption is 
the same across countries, and it is equivalent to that of its effect on aggregate output. 
However, the magnitude of the spillover effect on consumption is different across countries, 
depending on the consumption share. It is obvious that the magnitude of the consumption 
change is larger in the country with the larger consumption share. Meanwhile, the direction 
as well as the magnitude of the spillover effect on production is different across countries, 
depending on the spillover share. When spillovers from relaxed IPR protection take place in 
southern country k, its production decreases (increases) if its spillover share is sufficiently 
high (low), i.e., Sk > scl ( Sk< sc2 )• The spillovers in southern country k also affect the 
production in any country i, where i&k. Recall that the production in country i with the 
spillover share $, < /° ( si > sc0 ) decreases (increases) with increased spillovers in any 
southern country k. 
As long as there is a gap between the production and the consumption change in 
each country, the trade across countries must change to restore world market equilibrium. 
Which countries import or export depend on both the consumption share and the spillover 
share. To analyze the net trade effect of spillovers, we define net trade as follows: 
20 Recall that the critical value of the spillover share, 5e0, becomes negative under the condition of Case 2. 
21 The parameter ( (j) ) becomes negative under the condition of Case 2 while parameters (A, Î] )are still positive. 
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Definition 3: Let NTI denote the net trade of country i. Then, NTt = qt ~ 6 i Q ,  i = 1,2, , n. 
First, consider the case in which aggregate output decreases with spillovers in any 
southern country k (Case 1). The consumption in all countries decreases because of the fall of 
aggregate output, and the consumption reduction is larger in a country with the larger 
consumption share. Equation (9) analyzes the own net trade effect of spillovers: 
Since the second term on the right hand side is positive under Case 1 (~0 k dQ/d j3 k  > 0), it is 
straightforward to show that the own net trade effect of spillovers is positive for southern 
countries with a spillover share, sk < sc2, because the production in these countries increases 
with spillovers in their countries ( dqjdfik >0). The southern countries with spillover share, 
Sk > scl, may also experience a net increase in exports even though the production in their 
countries decreases with spillovers. This is true for southern countries whose consumption 
share is relatively large compared to the spillover share. In these countries the fall of 
consumption dominates the decreased production. We can find a critical value of the 
consumption share, 0cl = -~^(/n-<psk), which is a linear function of the spillover share. As 
seen in Figure 4, the net trade effect of spillovers is positive (negative) in southern countries 
wi th  t he  consumpt ion  sha re ,  Q k  > 0 c l ( s k )  (6k  <  0 c 2 ( s k ) ) -
The spillovers in any southern country k also affect the net trade of other countries. 
This cross effect of spillovers on net trade is analyzed in Equation (10) 
(10) = i = 1,2,....,n, k  = 2,....,n, i * k  
4% 4% 
As mentioned earlier, under Case 1 consumption in any country i decreases with increased 
spillovers in southern country k. Thus, the cross effect of spillovers on net trade is positive 
for the countries with spillover share, s, < sc0, whose production increases with increased 
spillovers in southern country k. It is also possible that the countries with spillover share, 
Si > sc0, whose production decreases with spillovers, may have the increase of net exports. 
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The decreased production is overwhelmed by the fall of the consumption for the countries 
with the relatively big consumption share compared to the spillover share. The critical value 
of the consumption share, 0e3 = ~^-(2-0s,),  plays a crucial role in investigating the cross 
effect of spillovers on net trade (see Figure 4). 
Lemma 7: For i = 1,2,....,», k = 2,....,«, i^k 
(a) Under Case 1, dTRtJdpk >=< 0 o 0k >=< 0e2 = ~(ju -(f>Sk) 12, //, 0 > 0 
Under Case 2, dTRk/dj3k > 0 
(b) Under Case 1, dTRi/d(3k >=< 0 <=> <9, >=< 0c3 = -(2-05 i)/2 
Under Case 2, dTR jdfik < 0 
Proof) (a) = âiïÇL 
^A ^A 
( yy )  (YY)  
=  or  [ 2 n Sk - { (n  +  l ) s k - l }£xk]~0k  —(2 S k -£ x k )  
2(n + i) s k  2(n + l) s k  
( r r f 2  
= — —— [ 0 k ( S x k - ^ S k )  + ^  St~{(« + 1) S k - V l £ x k \  2(n + l ) s k  
Using Definition 2 for sxk yields the result. 
~  [0 i (£xk~ 2 Sk )  +  '^Sk  + { (n  +  l ) s i - l } e x k \  2  (n  +1)  S k  
Using Definition 2 for yields the result. 
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On the other hand, under the condition of Case 2 aggregate output increases when 
DPR protection is relaxed in any southern country. Thus, the consumption in any country 
increases, and the increased amount of the consumption is larger in the country with the 
larger consumption share. Meanwhile, under the condition of Case 2 the production increases 
in the southern country that IPR protection is relaxed, but decreases in the other countries. 
Therefore, regardless of the consumption share or the spillover share, it is obvious that the 
country in which increased spillovers has net exports increase, while the others experience a 
decline in net exports. 
(a) Case 1 (b) Case 2 
R1 
R2 R2 
R3 
sc0 sc2 1/2 
Rl: dTRk/dpk > 0, dTRjdfi, > 0, R2: dTRk/d/3k > 0, dTRi/d/3k < 0 
1/2 
R3: dTRk/d/3k <0, dTRi/dfik < 0 
Figure 3.4 Net trade effect of spillovers 
3.5.4 Implications and discussions 
The preference towards IPR protection will be different among southern countries 
depending on both the consumption and the spillover share. By our analysis, southern 
countries can be classified into three groups in terms of the welfare effects of spillovers. Two 
critical values of consumption share, which are quadratic functions of the spillover share, 
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play a crucial role in classifying southern countries: 0CÏ = s*)(A + tj sô and 
0cO = (2-^sk)(A + rjsk), where 0cl > 0cO for any given Sk • The first group consists of 
southern countries with 0<0cO(sk) • This group prefers relaxing IPR protection in all 
southern countries ( dWk/dfik > 0 and dWi/dfik >0). The positive own (also cross) effects 
of spillovers on profits dominate the negative effects on consumer surplus in these countries 
(\d7Tk/dj3k\ > \dCSk/dpk\ and \dm/dj3k\ > \dCSt/d/3k\ ). 
The second group consists of southern countries with 0 c O  < 0 <  0 c l  . The 
governments in this group prefer loose IPR protection in their own countries, but they would 
resist it in other southern countries (dWk/dj3k>0 and dWi/d/3k< 0). The own effect of 
spillovers on profits is positive, and it dominates the negative effect on consumer surplus 
(\dnk/d0k\>\dCSk/dfik\). However, the countries in this group are worse off when IPR 
protection is relaxed in other southern countries because both the profit and the consumer 
surplus effects of spillovers in the other countries are negative for these countries. Finally, 
the southern countries with 0 > 0cl can be classified as the third group. This group would 
prefer tightening IPR protection in all southern countries ( dWkldfik < 0 and 
dWi/d/3k<0).22 Both the profit and consumer effects of spillovers are negative for this 
group no matter what spillovers take place in this group or in the other groups. 
How can the conflicts between the northern country and southern countries or 
among southern countries be resolved? It may be difficult to find a solution as long as the 
three groups coexist in the world market.23 The third group should provide more IPR 
protection because the countries in this group are always better off by tightening IPR 
protection. If all southern countries in the market are categorized in this group, therefore, 
there cannot exist conflicts between the North and South. In this sense, the previous result24 
that the conflicts between the North and South would be the rule may not be true. On the 
22 Under Case 2, this group doesn't exist in the world market. 
23 Given that the sum of the consumption share is one, it is possible that three groups coexist in the world 
market (see Figure 2). However, it is also possible that one group or two groups exist depending on how big the 
consumption share of each southern country is. 
24 Both Chin and Grossman (1988) and Zigié (1998) derive the conflicts between the North and the South when 
the market turns out to be duopoly. 
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other hand, the first group would vote for loose IPR protection in the southern countries since 
spillovers through relaxing IPR in any southern country are favorable for these countries in 
terms of domestic welfare. The countries in the second group prefer relaxing IPR in their 
countries, but tightening in the other groups. Therefore, it does not seem possible to 
completely resolve the conflicts between the North and the South or among the southern 
countries with the coexistence of the three groups in the market. Extending the tight IPR 
protection to all southern countries benefits the third group, but hurts the first group. Its 
effect on the second group would be negative if the own welfare effect of spillovers 
dominates the positive cross welfare effect. If the cross welfare effects of spillovers can be 
ignored in the WTO meeting, it is obvious that the third group should provide more IPR 
protection while the first and the second groups provide less IPR protection. 
Table 3.2 Summary of spillover effects25 
Case 1 ( dQf dPk < 0 ) Case 2 ( dQ/ dPk > 0 ) 
Profits dnk!dpk >=< 0 <=» sk <=> sc2 
d7ii!dPk >=< 0 <=> si <=> /°, /° < /2 
d7ik! dPk > 0, dTii! dPk < 0 
Consumer 
surplus 
dCSk/dPk < 0, dCSi/dPk < 0 dCSk/dPk > 0, dCSi/dpk > 0 
Welfare dWk/dPk >=< 0 «ft <=> 0cl  (sk) dWk/dPk > 0 
dWi/dPk >=< 0 <=> Qi <=> 6c0(si) dWi/dPk >=< 0 « 0 t  >=< 0cO(Si) 
Net trade dTRk/dPk >=< 0<=>& <=> 0c2(Sk) dTRk/dpk > 0 
dTRi/dPk >=< 0 <=> 0, <=> 0c3(sd dTRt/dpk < 0 
25 For parameter conditions of both Case 1 and Case 2, see Table 1. 
55 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated welfare effects of spillovers due to relaxed IPR 
protection. Unlike previous studies where two countries, North and South, are modeled, we 
consider the situation where there exist many southern countries in the market. One 
important feature in the model is to distinguish southern countries according to the absorptive 
capacity to realize spillovers. This is crucial in analyzing the conflicts among southern 
countries on IPR protection issue. Assuming that the differentiated policy on IPR protection 
can be made through the international meeting under the WTO, we ask which southern 
countries should provide more or less IPR protection. 
Some findings are obtained from the analysis. The spillovers in any southern 
country from relaxing IPR protection may reduce or raise the firm's unit production cost, 
depending on its spillover share. The firm makes profit gains whenever its unit production 
cost decrease with spillovers. There is a possibility that the profit effect of spillovers is also 
positive even when its unit production costs increase. This happens when the R&D efficiency 
of the northern firm is sufficiently low or if its spillover share is not too big. However, the 
profit gains come at the expense of consumers because spillovers in any southern country 
result in a reduction of aggregate output. 
The welfare effects of spillovers depend on both the consumption share and the 
spillover share. The southern countries can be classified into three groups in terms of the 
welfare effects of spillovers. The first group consists of countries with both sufficiently low 
spillover and consumption shares. The countries in this group are better off from relaxing 
IPR protection both in their countries and in other countries. The second group consists of 
countries whose spillover share is sufficiently low and consumption share is intermediate, or 
the countries where both consumption and spillover share is not too big. The countries in this 
group are better off from increased spillovers in their country, but worse off from spillovers 
in other countries. Finally, the third group may consist of three types of southern countries: 
countries with relatively low spillover share but high consumption share, countries with 
intermediate spillover share and relatively big consumption share, or countries with 
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sufficiently high spillover share. This group suffers a welfare loss when the degree of IPR 
protection decreases in any southern country. 
As long as all southern countries belong in the third group, the previous result that 
the conflict between the North and the South is the rule, is not true. Tightening IPR 
protection benefits both the northern country and southern countries. As long as all three 
groups coexist in the market, however, the conflicts on IPR protection between the North and 
the South as well as among southern countries cannot be completely resolved. Extending 
tight IPR protection to the world benefits the third group, but hurts the first group while it 
may or may not hurt the second group. 
There are some extensions of this study. How much each country absorbs the 
knowledge or information from the other country depends on its ability or capacity to realize 
knowledge spillovers. Thus, introducing costly spillovers will be more interesting and 
realistic. Second, the existence of spillovers may increase the northern firm's incentive to sell 
its innovations to the southern countries. Thus, the issue of licensing will be an important 
topic as future research. Third, the direct extension of this chapter would be to investigate 
optimal patent policy in terms of domestic welfare or how to reach an agreement of IPR 
protection that is Pareto improving. Finally, some developing countries have rapidly 
increased R&D investment for the development of new products. Future research should 
include R&D investment of southern countries. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES AS A TOOL OF 
STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY 
4.1 Introduction 
The welfare effects of R&D cooperation under the presence of technological 
involuntary spillovers have been extensively studied in a closed economy context (for 
example, see d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992)). The main result is 
that the R&D cooperation through forming an RJV may yield the best outcome, in terms of 
firms' profit as well as social welfare (Kamien et al. (1992)). One limitation of these works is 
that spillovers (information sharing) within a research joint venture (RJV) are treated as 
exogenous and beyond the control of firms. 
Unlike previous studies, we introduce endogenous spillovers within an RJV.1 To 
increase the degree of information sharing, the firms under the RJV incur spillover costs. 
These costs may include management or monitoring costs to maintain an RJV.2 Also, 
spillover costs may be small for the R&D intensive industry because one firm's ability to 
absorb or assimilate the rival firm's knowledge is likely to depend on its own R&D 
investment (Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Levin et al. (1987)). We show that the degree of 
information sharing within an RJV depends on the spillover costs. 
One motivation of introducing endogenous spillovers is to see if firms may have an 
incentive to affect final market competition by controlling the degree of information sharing.3 
In the United States, the passage of the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) in 1984 
seemed to promote R&D joint projects.4 However, antitrust authorities are still concerned 
about the competition effect that the RJV may have on the final market since there remains a 
1 The only three papers, which consider the R&D cooperation game where firms choose the degree of 
spillovers, are Katz (1986), Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998), and Poyago-Theotoky (1999). 
2 Note that spillover costs may reflect systematic obstacles like organizational differences among the firms as 
well as actual monetary costs to acquire and assimilate rival firm's knowledge. 
3 Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) show that for the product innovation and Bertrand competition non-maximal 
(partial) spillovers are chosen under the RJV, which is due to anticompetitive reasons. 
4 In Europe, the block exemption from article 85 under the Treaty of Rome corresponds to NCRA in USA. 
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possibility that any economic agreement may behave like a cartel.5 Actually, the RJV is 
recognized as a cartel in the R&D literature dealing with spillovers in the sense that it has 
uniformly assumed the joint profit maximization under the RJV at the investment stage.6 
Nevertheless, any anticompetitive outcome under the RJV is ignored since the literature 
usually focuses on examining the positive effect of RJVs on innovative or economic 
performance.7 In this chapter, we show that the RJV may yield the anticompetitive outcome, 
and we identify when antitrust authorities should be concerned about these outcomes.8 
The main contribution of this chapter is to examine welfare implications of the RJV 
in an international economy. We combine the analysis of the R&D cooperation with strategic 
trade policy theory. The key question is whether the government should allow its domestic 
firms to form an RJV. Motta (1996) and Steurs (1997) are the only two papers where similar 
questions are addressed. They investigate the role of the RJV in an international market. One 
important difference between our model and theirs is that they assume that the degree of 
information sharing under the RJV is exogenously given while we focus on examining how 
spillovers are determined within an RJV. The study in this chapter is possibly related to Qiu 
and Tao's paper (1998). They investigate the role of the government's R&D policy when a 
domestic firm cooperates with its foreign rival in the R&D activity. While they examine the 
optimal policy on R&D cooperation we consider 'allowing an RJV formation' as the only 
possible policy, and investigate whether it is beneficial in terms of domestic welfare. 
We extend d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model to examine the welfare 
implications of the RJV in an international economy.9 There are two countries (home and 
foreign) and each country consists of two firms (firm i and firm ;'). Firms are ex-ante identical. 
We consider three games: Game N N , Game J N  (or N J  ), and Game J  J  . Each game 
consists of two stages, R&D and output stage. In a final market (output stage) four firms 
5 Ordover and Willig (1985) suggest a special treatment of RJVs and horizontal mergers in the R&D intensive 
industry under the antitrust laws. 
6 It is briefly mentioned below that the joint profit maximization under the RJV may not make sense. 
7 One exception we recognize is Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) (see footnote 3). 
8 These implications can be obtained even though we consider an international market. 
9 While d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is usually used to explain the role of the involuntary 
spillovers, we assume away the existence of the involuntary spillovers to focus on examining the role of the 
RJV as a policy tool in an international economy when spillovers are endogenously determined under the RJV. 
Note that introducing involuntary spillovers does not qualitatively affect our results. 
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compete with a homogenous good. A final market may be a 'third-market' or an integrated 
market.10 In the R&D stage, the firms engage in R&D activities whose benefit is to lower 
marginal production costs. The way to coordinate R&D activities is to form an RJV. Under 
the RJV, firms choose the degree of information sharing as well as R&D efforts to maximize 
joint profits. We consider only the national RJV, not the international RJV. This is because 
we want to see whether an RJV may work as a tool of strategic trade policy. 
Table 4.1 Summary of the game 
Game R&D stage Output stage 
N N  
- All firms choose R&D efforts non-cooperatively to 
maximize own profits. 
- No firm can share its rivals' knowledge. 
Cournot 
competition 
J N  
- The RJV is formed only in the home country. 
- Home firms choose both R&D efforts and the degree of 
information sharing (spillovers) simultaneously to 
maximize joint profits under the RJV. 
- Foreign firms decide R&D levels to maximize own profits. 
- Home (RJV) and foreign firms compete non-cooperatively 
Cournot 
competition 
J J  
- The RJV is formed in each country (two RJVs). 
- The firms choose both R&D efforts and the degree of 
information sharing simultaneously to maximize joint 
profits under the RJV in each country. 
- Home and foreign firms (RJVs) compete non-cooperatively 
Cournot 
competition 
The games differ in whether firms choose to cooperate in the R&D stage. In the 
game NN, each firm chooses R&D efforts non-cooperatively to maximize its own profits. 
No firm in this game can share its rivals' knowledge. This game serves as the benchmark 
when we analyze the welfare effects of research joint ventures. In the game JN ( NJ ), only 
10 The analysis of the integrated market gives welfare implications of the RJV consisting of some (not all) firms 
in the industry in a closed economy. Note that the literature usually assumes an industry-wide RJV. 
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the home (foreign) firms form an RJV while the foreign (home) firms do not. The firms in 
the home (foreign) country choose the degree of information sharing as well as R&D efforts 
to maximize joint profits. Meanwhile, the firms in the foreign (home) country choose R&D 
efforts non-cooperatively to maximize own profits. In the game J J, the firms in both the 
home and foreign countries form an RJV in each country. Since we only consider a national 
RJV, firms from different countries always compete non-cooperatively in the R&D stage 
regardless of the game. Note that we assume the RJV formation is an exogenously given 
policy by the government.11 
Each stage consists of a simultaneous game. We try to derive the Nash 
equilibrium(a) in every stage, and finally identify the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium 
(SPNE). We show that the firms under the RJV do not share any information if spillover 
costs are sufficiently high while they choose maximal spillovers within an RJV if spillover 
costs are sufficiently low.12 The minimal spillovers are chosen due to the anticompetitive 
effect. This result contrasts with previous studies where complete information sharing 
(spillovers) within an RJV is usually assumed. We also find that there are multiple Nash 
equilibria(NEa). Under the game JN, minimal or maximal spillovers are chosen within an 
RJV when spillover costs lie in an intermediate range. Meanwhile, under the game J  J ,  
asymmetric spillovers between the two countries (RJVs) turn out to be the Nash equilibria for 
a moderate range of spillover costs. 
To provide the answer as to whether any government should allow its domestic 
firms to form an RJV, we consider two market structures: a 'third market' and an integrated 
market. We show that many results obtained in the third market structure become reversed in 
the integrated market structure. For example, under the game JN, if spillover costs are 
sufficiently high ( k > k2 ) then the home country is better off by allowing an RJV in the third 
market structure, but RJV formation hurts the home country in the integrated market 
11 We also assume that the firms join in an RJV whenever the government allows an RJV formation. 
Introducing the firms' decision stage as to whether to join in an RJV does not qualitatively change the results, 
but makes the analysis very complex. 
12 The corner solution of spillovers (/? = 0,/? = 1) is due to the assumption of linear spillover costs. With 
quadratic form of spillover costs we can get partial spillovers ( 0 < {$ < 1 ). What we want to investigate is 
whether the maximal spillovers within an RJV always occur. 
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structure. This is basically due to the home firms' choice of spillovers under the RJV. They 
choose symmetric minimal spillovers, which yields the increased final market price. The 
home firms' profits increase, but the consumer surplus decreases. The consumer loss 
dominates the increased home firms' profits. We also identify when the foreign country has 
an incentive to retaliate for the home country's RJV formation, and investigate the welfare 
implications when both the home and foreign countries allow an RJV formation in each 
country. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review on 
R&D cooperation and strategic trade policy. Section 3 sets up the model and identifies the 
Nash equilibria both in the R&D and output stage. Section 4 compares R&D outcomes and 
final outputs among the considered games. Section 5 provides welfare implications of the 
RJV (R&D cooperation) in an international economy. The last section provides conclusions. 
4.2 Literature Review 
A country has many instruments with which to conduct trade policy. For example, 
export subsidies or taxes can be directed towards production, while R&D subsidies or taxes 
can be directed towards innovation. However, the former measures are increasingly difficult 
for governments to pursue because they are strictly forbidden by the WTO. This leads to a 
need for further analysis of trade policy measures directed towards innovation. Besides, the 
merits of subsidizing exporting firms have to be reexamined in terms of one key 
consideration in the recent R&D literature: the benefit of forming a research joint venture 
(see Kamien et al. (1992)). 
The welfare implications of RJVs in open economies have been little studied. Only 
some studies, recently, have dealt with the role of the R&D cooperation (or research joint 
ventures) in the presence of international competition. Motta (1996), Steurs (1997), Qiu and 
Tao (1998), and Neary and O'Sullivan (1999) combine the analysis of the R&D cooperation 
with the strategic trade policy theory.13 
Motta (1996) and Steurs (1997) extended the d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) 
13 See Brander (1995) for an excellent survey of strategic trade policy literature 
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model to study the effect of research joint ventures as a policy tool in an international 
economy. Both of them consider the case of two symmetric firms each located in a different 
country. The spillover parameter is exogenously given. Motta assumes that firms can achieve 
complete information sharing within an RJV while the degree of spillovers does not change 
with R&D cooperation in Steurs. One interesting result is that, contrary to other trade policies, 
which lead to a prisoner's dilemma result, welfare in both countries increases when they both 
allow R&D cooperation (Motta). An even more surprising result is that when national R&D 
cooperation results in higher welfare for the cooperating country, this may be also true for the 
non-cooperating country (Steurs). In this paper, we show that these results may not hold if 
the degree of information sharing is endogenously determined. 
In Neary and O'Sullivan (1999) firms face exogenously given spillovers, and 
spillovers do not change with R&D cooperation. A domestic and a foreign firm export a 
homogenous good to a third market. They study international R&D cooperation with export 
subsidization both in general, and for specific functional forms. The main results of Neary 
and O'Sullivan are summarized as follows. First, an export subsidy may increase welfare 
relative to R&D cooperation if the government can commit to an export subsidy. Second, 
without commitment, subsidization may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation 
and lower even than free trade. 
Qiu and Tao (1998) study the role of the government's R&D policy when a 
domestic firm cooperates with its foreign rival in the R&D activity. Two types of R&D 
cooperation are examined: 'Collaboration and coordination'. In the case of the R&D 
collaboration, the two firms share the benefits of their R&D investments in that firm i's unit 
cost of production depends on its own R&D investment and firm fs investment. Meanwhile, 
in the case of the R&D coordination each firm chooses its R&D investment to maximize a 
weighted joint profit (i.e., ni+oc^j ,0 < a < 1). Qiu and Tao show that R&D subsidy is an 
optimal policy in the latter case while R&D subsidy or tax are possible in the former case. 
Our work differs from Qiu and Tao's in the sense that we consider 'allowing an RJV 
formation' as the only possible policy. While we recognize the need to examine the optimal 
policy on R&D cooperation we also believe whether allowing an RJV formation is a 
desirable policy should be addressed first to avoid ambiguous policy suggestions. 
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4.3 The Model and Equilibrium 
4.3.1 The Model 
We consider a model where two countries (home and foreign country) compete in an 
international market. Two firms (firm 1 and firm 2) exist in each country. In a final market, 
fou r  f i rms  se l l  a  homogenous  p roduc t ,  whose  inve r se  demand  i s  g iven  by  P  =  A - Q  ,  
Q  =  J ]  ( q l  +  q ) , i  = 1,2. q t  and q .  denote the final output production for firm i  located in the 
i 
home and foreign country, respectively. We use an upper bar to denote variables associated 
with the foreign country. In a previous stage, each firm invests in R&D to reduce its unit 
production cost, which is a function of its own R&D investment, rival firm's R&D 
investment, and spillovers so that firm V s unit production cost is written by 
(l) C i  = c - % i - f i i % r C i  = c-~xi-lPâj where' °-A'Â51' »> 7 = 1.2, i * j .  
Xi (%) represents R&D investment of firm i  located in the home (foreign) 
country, fi denotes the degree of spillovers (information sharing) between the firms within an 
RJV. The firm in any country benefits from the other national, but not international, firm's 
knowledge since we consider only the national research joint venture. We assume away 
involuntary information spillovers since we focus on examining how the degree of 
information within an RJV is determined in the economy.14 R&D technology exhibits 
diminishing returns to scale to R&D investment so that its cost is written by 
TCi(Zi)= ' TCiix) = rX2i12 for the home and foreign firms, respectively, y  
denotes R&D efficiency. A higher y  implies lower R&D efficiency. As seen in the unit 
production function, we assume that the degree of spillovers from which the firm benefits is 
determined by its own ability to absorb or assimilate rival firm's R&D knowledge (Cohen 
and Levinthal 1989). Each firm that absorbs the rival firm's knowledge incurs costs, which 
depend on the amount of information sharing.15 We assume that this cost increases with the 
14 Griliches (1995) provides an excellent review of empirical studies for the existence of involuntary R&D 
spillovers. Introducing involuntary spillovers does not qualitatively change key results obtained in this chapter. 
1 Vilasuso and Frascatore (2000) introduce a costly RJV in which firms face costs depending on the degree of 
spillovers even though they assume spillovers are exogenously given. 
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amount of knowledge absorbed so that this spillover (or information sharing) cost for the 
home and foreign firms can be written by K, = k /?, and = k p., i -1,2. These costs may 
be smaller if the industry is R&D intensive because one firm's ability to absorb or assimilate 
rival firm's knowledge is likely to depend on its own R&D investment.16 Thus, k may be 
industry specific as well as firm specific. 
Table 4.2 Notational definitions 
Game 
Equilibrium per firm profit, consumer surplus, and welfare 
Home Country Foreign Country 
N N  V N N , a  C S N N  , W N N  V N N  , a C S N "  , w N N  
J N  V J N  , a c S J N  , W J N  V J N  , â c S J " , W J N  
J J  V J J  , a C S J J  , W J J  V J J  , a C S J 1  , W J 1  
Table 2 defines some notations used in the paper. V  denotes the equilibrium per 
firm profit (final stage profit - R&D cost). CS denotes total consumer surplus. In an 
integrated market, the home country consumes a portion of total consumption while the 
foreign country consumes a portion of total consumption. Thus, the consumer surplus for 
the home and foreign country is denoted by aCS and aCS , respectively. W and W denote 
the domestic welfare for the home and foreign country, respectively. 
4.3.2 Equilibrium 
The nature of the equilibrium is the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. As usual, 
we solve the two-stage game using backwards induction. First, we solve for the Nash 
equilibrium in a final market. Second, the R&D levels and the degree of information sharing 
(under the RJV) under all three games are determined. 
In the final stage, the firms face Cournot competition regardless of the game. Each 
firm chooses quantity to maximize its own profits (i.e., n. = P(Q)q - Ctq; X given the 
16 Kogut (1989) identifies several factors that may affect the costs associated with maintaining an RJV. 
65 
previous stage R&D investment. Solving the problem yields final stage output and profit as a 
function of R&D investment and spillovers: 
(2) qi = A-4 C i  +  Ci +  Cj +  Cj -  =  A-4C i  +  Cj +  C i  + Cj ^  =  { q )2 -  =  Qf 
where, j,i = 1,2. 
In the first stage, the firms engage in the R&D non-cooperation or the R&D 
cooperation. The way to coordinate R&D activities is to join in an RJV, given an RJV 
formation is allowed by the government. We determine the R&D efforts and the degree of 
spillovers (under the RJV) in the next three sub-sections. 
4.3.2.1 R&D Non-cooperation in both countries (game N N  )  
Consider the game ( N N  ) where neither government allows an RJV formation. Thus, 
there is no way to coordinate R&D activities and to share information among firms. Hence, 
each firm's unit production cost is simply a function of its own R&D investment: 
Ci = c~ Zi and Ci = c~ Xi where i = 1,2. Each firm chooses the level of R&D investments 
to maximize its own profit (the final stage profit - R&D costs). The profit for the home firm i  
is written by 
0 )  v , = „ - r c , ( ^ ) ^ A ' c + 4 x " ^ ^ - + ^ ) > 2 - i - u .  
The first and second order conditions are as follows: 
o  X i  2 5  ^  X i  
The first and second order conditions for the foreign firms can be similarly derived. 
Assuming symmetric solution (%, = = %. = %. = %NN ), we can get the equilibrium R&D 
investment: x"" = 17 Finally, we can get the following outcomes under the R&D 
17 As seen in Henriques (1990), the equilibrium R&D investment under the non-cooperative game may not be 
stable even though the second order condition is satisfied. Using the stability condition ^Xi/^x\ < 1, this is 
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non-cooperation: 
N N  _ 8(A-c) n „ _ 5 r ( A - c )  N N _  2 0 y ( A - c )  N „  y ( A - c f ( 25/-32) 
^ 25y-8 ' ^ (25y-8) ' (25y-8) ' (25y-8)" 
4.3.2.2 R&D cooperation only in one country (game JN(NJ)) 
In this subsection, we consider the case where the firms in one country form an RJV 
to coordinate R&D activities while the firms located in the other country do not. To avoid 
notational complexity we assume that the home country is the cooperating country while the 
foreign country is the non-cooperating country (JN). Thus, firms' unit production costs will 
be different between the home and foreign countries: C, = c--/?,Zj, C, ~c~ Zr where 
i * j, i, j = 1,2. Recall that we do not consider an international R&D cooperation where two 
firms from different countries form an RJV.18 Given the final stage profits, the home firms 
under the RJV maximize their joint profits while choosing the R&D investment and the 
amount of information sharing (/?, ) simultaneously.19 The home firms incur a spillover cost 
to absorb other firm's knowledge under the RJV. 
The joint profit function can be written as: 
(5) VT  = V t  +  VJ• = {A -  c  + (4 - fi.) ZI + (4 P i  ~ 1) ZJ ~ Z, ~ zf ~^Z? ~ k A 
+ -^ {A - c + (4 -Pi)Zj + (4 Pj ~ VZi ~ Zi ~ zf ~ ^ Z? ~ k A 
where, i ^ j, i, j = 1,2. 
true in our model if y  <  40/25 . If the equilibrium is unstable (in Henriques' term), we may have to consider 
a corner solution where only one firm invests in R&D under the R&D non-cooperation game. Note that we 
assume y > 120/25 to avoid unstable situations under all games considered in the paper. 
18 Steurs (1997) examines welfare effects between a domestic and an international R&D cooperation. 
19 We follow the assumption of joint profit maximation as the standard in the literature in the sense that the 
literature has uniformly assumed joint profit maximization under the RJV. However, whether this assumption is 
appropriate requires further analysis since it is difficult to believe that firms, in reality, can write the contracts to 
maximize joint profits when they are competitors in a final market. For example, if firm's profit is a portion of 
total profits under the RJV and the portion depends on its own R&D spending then it may be more profitable for 
the firm to deviate from joint profit max. by maximizing its own profit choosing own R&D spending. Salant 
and Shaffer(1998) and Anbarci et al.(2002) briefly mention this issue. 
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Meanwhile, the foreign firms choose R&D investments to maximize their own profits 
(including R&D cost), which can be written by 
(6) V i  =  ^ i A ~ c  +  A X r X j  ~  C1 +  P ) X i  " U + A)Z,}2 -^z,2, i ± j ,  *,7 = 1,2 
The first order conditions for joint profit maximization of the home firms are 
(?) -c + (4-+ (4#-D%, 
+  ^ - { A - c  +  ( 4 - / 3 , ) Z j  +  1  ) X i ~ X i  ~  x M ' X j )  ~ k  =  °  
25 
d y T  _  2  
3%, 25 {A - c + (4 - P ) X i  + (4P i  ~  1 ) X j  -  X i  -  X j K
4  
-  P )  
+ ^ -{A-c + (4-P[)x3 + (4 p .  - 1  ) X i  ~  X i  ~  x M 4 P j  " I ) "  Y  X i  =  0  
where, i *  j , i  =  1,2. 
The second order conditions are: for i *  j , i  =  1,2 
=  ^ {(4-^)2 +  ( 4 p j - l ) } -Z<0 forallO</?<l if  y > ^  
d X i  
2 
= -{(4-Pj)( 4 Pi -1) + (4 - /?,.)( 4  p .  - 1)}  
25 
Assuming that R&D investment and the spillovers are simultaneously determined, 
we can solve the problem. From the second order condition with respect to spillovers, we 
should consider corner solutions (/? = 0 or >5 = 1). That is, the firms under the RJV will 
choose either minimal or maximal spillovers. Note that the corner solution of spillovers is 
due to the assumption of linear spillover costs.20 This is confirmed from the fact that the 
20 The solution of spillovers will depend on the specific form of cost function. With quadratic form of spillover 
costs we can get the partial (0</?<l)or maximal ( P = 1 ) spillovers. The main thing is to show that 
maximal spillovers under the RJV are not necessarily guaranteed by the existence of spillover costs. 
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Hessian matrix of spillovers is positive definite. That is, Hp — 
d 2 V T  d 2 V T  
d 2 v T  d 2 v T  
a^ 
(9) Zjj- = — { A -c  + 4x r X j -(1 + P ) X i -(1 + A)Zy}- V Z i  =  0  
where Ha >0, k =  i ,  j  and \Hp\ = ^ X* > ® • Meanwhile, we can find out an interior 
solution of R&D investment from the first order condition. The Hessian matrix of R&D 
investment is negative definite, which implies that the interior solution is optimal.21 All four 
firms determine the equilibrium R&D investment simultaneously. Therefore, we need to 
consider first order conditions of the foreign firms' profit maximization. The first and second 
order conditions with respect to the foreign firms' R&D investment are as follows: 
d v ± _  8 
~~2 = ^7 - ^  < 0 ' where i*  j ,  i ,  j  =  1,2. 
From the first order conditions ((7) and (9)), we get four best response functions. 
B = (4-^X4#-l) + (4-£X4yS,-l), D = 25}-2((4-^/ + (4y6.-l)2} 
- «A.-c)-8* -8<1+ /?,)*,-8(1+ /?,)*, „ 
Xr 5^335 , where i* j, 1,7 =1,2. 
Recalling that we have a corner solution for spillovers under the RJV (minimal 
spillovers /? = 0 or maximal spillovers /? = 1) and solving (10) simultaneously, we can get 
the following final outcomes under the game JN : 
21 Hkk <• 0 from the equation (8), and assuming symmetric spillovers we can show that 
\H*\ = r2- 4z{(4 - P)2 + ( 4 /3 -1)2}/ 25 + 36(1-jf)2 / 25 > 0 if y  >  72/ 25. 
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1. Firms under the RJV choose symmetric minimal spillovers (/?, = /?;. = /? = 0), 
Z™(0 = O)= t(A-cX5r-8) _ -™(/? = 0) = . 8(A-0(5^-6) 
125/ -210%+ 48 125/-210/+48 
g"(/r = 0)= Sy(A-c)(5r-8) -»^ = 0)= 5y(A-CX5>-6) 
125/-210/+ 48 y 125/-210/+ 48 
^»(ig = 0)=^A-^<»-8»'<2»-18),r»(;g=0)=r(A-c)2(5r-6)'(25y-32) 
(125fJ-210f+48)2 (125^-210^ + 48)2 
eJ»(^=0) = 'Qr(A-cXioy-i4) 
125fï-210r+48 
2. Firms under the RJV choose symmetric maximal spillovers (/?. = /3j = fi = 1), 
12(A-c)(5/-8) - j T i , a  1X 8(A - c)(5/ - 24) y (y5 — 1) — y  ( B  = 1) 
125/-480/+ 192 Z 125/-480/+ 192 
=  =  5 r ( A - c ) ( 5 r - 8 )  =  =  5 r ( A - c X S r - 2 4 )  
125/-480/+ 192 y 125/-480/+ 192 
= 1) = r(A-0=(5/-8)=(25/-72) 
(125/-480/+ 192)' 
~JN(J3 = 1) = / (A - c)2 (5/ - 24)2 (25/ - 32) ^ ^ = 10/(A-c)(10/-32) 
(125/-480/+ 192/ ' 125/-480/+ 192 
3. Firms under the RJV choose asymmetric spillovers (/?, £ /3j(e.g.,f3i = 0,/?; = 1)), 
y J " ( B  =0 B  -n - 12(A-c)(/-l)(5/-8) 
' ' 
J 125/-470/+ 420/-96' 
= 0, A = 1) = 125 ^ 47o^ +42^.96 
= 0,/J, = l) = 128^4^+42o^% ' 
Tr/^znix _ (A-c)2/(625/5 -5800/ +18960/3- 28168/ +19072/-4608) y (u,l) : : 2 ' 
(125 / - 470 / + 420/- 96) 
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v ^ ( 1 0 )  _  (-A ~  c ) 2  y 2  (625 /4 - 2950 /3+4740/2 - 2752/ + 256) 
(125 y 3  - 470 /2 + 420/ - 9 ô f  
To examine when the firms under the RJV choose minimal, maximal, or asymmetric 
spillovers we need to compare joint profits: V^iP, = /?; = 0) , VJN (/?, = Pj = 1) , and 
VJN(Pi = 0,Pj = 1). The home firms choose the degree of information sharing within an 
RJV simultaneously. Each firm has two strategies of spillovers: P = 0, P = 1. Anticipating 
what strategies the other firm under the RJV will play, each firm selects its best strategy. 
Based on the payoff for each strategy, we can derive the Nash equilibria in this stage. 
Table 4.3 ( V i ( P i , P j ) , V j ( P i , P j )  ) in firms' decision of spillovers under the game J N  
j9, = 0 
p t = 0  v, (0,0), y y (0,0) y, (0,1), yy (0,1) 
A = i  y,. (1,0), y y (1,0) y, (1,1), yy (1,1) 
Note that we consider the games of complete information in the sense that the players know 
all relevant information, including spillover costs, payoffs, etc. Three kinds of Nash 
equilibria exist depending on spillover costs (see result l).22 
Firstly, if spillover costs are sufficiently high ( k  >  k 1  ), then both firms' choosing the 
symmetric minimal spillovers (/? = P} = 0) is the only pure strategy Nash equilibrium(NE). 
That is, it is the best response for any firm to choose minimal spillovers when the other firm 
under the RJV chooses minimal spillovers ( y, (/?,. = 0, /?y = 0) > y ,• (/?,. = 1, = 0) for any 
firm i ,  j  =  1,2, i  *  j  ). There are two ways to affect firms' profits under the RJV. The firm 
under the RJV can increase their profits by sharing no information from the other firm 
because it yields higher price through less R&D investment and less production, compared to 
the game NN. The other way to increase the firms' profits under the RJV is to increase 
22 There may be mixed strategy Nash equilibria, but we focus on looking only at pure strategy Nash equilibria. 
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market share. This is accomplished when firms under the RJV completely share their 
information because they have an incentive to increase R&D, which yields the increase of the 
final output production (for more detail, see section 4). If there were no spillover costs 
(k = 0 ), the firms under the RJV will always choose maximal spillovers because the market 
share effect dominates the price effect on the firms' profits. As long as spillover costs are 
sufficiently high, however, it is beneficial for the firms to choose minimal spillovers because 
the market share effect is overwhelmed by the negative effect of spillover costs and the price 
effect. 
Resultl: a)( = 0,/?y = 0) is NE for k > k1 • b) (/?, = l,/?; = 1) is NE for k < k2 • 
c )  ( f i .  =  0 , P j  =  0 )  a n d  ( / ? , .  =  1 ,  / T  =  1  )  a r e  N E a  f o r  k 1  <  k  <  k 2 -
Proof: For i ,  j  =  1,2, i  # j , and y  > 2 4 / 5  
a) V i (1,0,k  =  0 ) - V i (0,0) = 12/(A-c)/(/) -  = &'>0 
(125 / - 470 y + 420y - 96) (125 y - 210/ + 48) 
/(/) = 2734375/ - 22921875 y 1  + 80455000/ +153625000/ -1735062/ -11796736 / 
+ 46949376 / -10027008/ + 884736 > 0 
b) VT (14,& = 0)-VI (0,1) = 12/(A-c) /(/) =t'>0 
(125 / - 470 / + 420/ - 96) (125 / - 480/ +192) 
/(/) = 2734375/ +167356250/ - 44580500/ + 688615200/ - 629081600/ 
+ 331616256 / - 92749824/ +10616832 > 0 
c)23 It is a straightforward result from jfc1 < k2 (see corollary 1 for the numerical example) 
Secondly, if spillover costs are sufficiently low ( k  <  k 2  ), then the NE consists of 
both firms' choosing the symmetric maximal spillovers ( /?,. = /?;. = 1 ) under the RJV. The 
intuition is that, as long as spillover costs are sufficiently low, it is more beneficial for the 
23 The comparison of the size between two critical values of spillover costs can be checked analytically using 
the program, such as 'Scientific Notebook'. 
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firm to choose maximal spillovers because the increased market share effect dominates the 
negative effect of spillover costs and the price effect on their profits, that is, 
Vi (/?, = 1, P} = 1) > V, (fit = 0, Pj = 1) for any firm i, j = 1,2 ,i±j. Lastly, if spillover costs 
lie in an intermediate level (jfc1 < k  < jfc2), then there exist two Nash equilibria: P i  =  P j  =  0 
and Pi = Pj-l. That is, for any firm i, j = 1,2 ,i*j, Vi (/?, = 0, P. = 0) > y ,• (/?,. = 1, Pj = 0) 
and Vi (Pi = 1, Pj = 1) > Vi (Pt = 0, Pj = 1) ). We here provide a numerical example to clarify 
the above results. Table 3 shows the payoff of the firm under the RJV for y = 5,a-c = 10. 
Corollary 1 identifies the Nash equilibria for the numerical example with y = 5,a-c = 10. 
Table 4.4 ( y, (/?,., P j ) , V j  ( P t , P )  ) for y  -  5, a  -  c  = 10 under the game J N  
o
 
II 
Pi = 0 3.4305, 3.4305 1.225, 9.1769-k 
A = i 9.1769-k, 1.225 9.1076-k, 9.1076-k 
Corollary 1 : Consider a numerical example with y = 5,<z-c = 10 under the game JN. Then, 
a) (p .  =  0 , P j  =  0 )  is NE fork  > jfc1 = 5.7464. 
b) (Pt = 1,^. = 1) is NE for k < k 2  =  7.8826 
c) (>5, =0,y5y = 0) and (^,. = 1,^ = 1) are NEafor5.7464 =  k l < k < k 2  =  7.8826. 
Proof: It is straightforward to show the result from Table 4. 
4.3.2.3 R&D cooperation in each country (game JJ) 
In this section, we consider the case where two firms in each country form an RJV 
to coordinate R&D activities. Thus, there exist two RJVs, one at home and the other in the 
f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y .  T h u s ,  f i r m s '  u n i t  p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t  c a n  b e  w r i t t e n  b y  C i  =  c - - / ?  X j  >  
C i  = c~ X i ~ P i Z j  ' where i ,  j  =  1,2,  i *  j .  The final stage profits for each firm are given by 
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equation (2). The firms under the RJV in both countries maximize their joint profit while 
choosing the R&D investment and the amount of information sharing simultaneously. The 
firms incur spillover costs to absorb other firm's knowledge under the RJV. The joint profits 
( VHT = VI + V J ) for the home firms can be written by 
(12)F"T = ^ {A-c + (4-A)z, + (4A - 1)Z, " (1 + -d + D X j f  " *(A + f i j )  
where, i ,  j  = 1,2, i  ï  j .  
The first order conditions of spillovers and R&D investment for the home firms are 
(13) ~  =  j j { A - c  +  ( 4 - f i l ) z l H 4 f i , - » Z , - < X  +  ~ P ) z ,  -  a •+Â)i/K4z/) 
+  -^{A-c +  (4-/3l)zi +  (4/);-l)Zi-(1 + A,)z,-(1 + f t ) Z j )(- .Zj)- i  =° 
dv117 2 — 
aF=25 { A- c + ( 4-^ )^+ ( 4A-1 )^-(1 + /J / )z- ( 1 +A )^K4-i9P 
+^(A-c + (4-A)Zj + (4ySj-l)Z/-(l  + /8,)z, - ( 1  +  A)2' ,)(4A,-1)-? 'Z,=0  
where, i ,  j  =  1,2, i *  j . 
The second order conditions are: For i ,  j  = 1,2, i  *  j .  
(14)^=1^>0'Iaâ=-|^<0 
~~T = —{(4-A) + (4/?,-l) }-Z<0 for alio < /? < 1 if 7 > — 
= ^{(4-£,.)(4A -1) + (4 - /?,)(4/?, -1)} 
Likewise, the first and second order conditions for the foreign firms can be derived. 
Assuming that R&D investment and the spillovers are simultaneously determined, we can 
solve the problem. From the first order conditions, we can derive the following four best 
response functions of R&D investment. 
6(A-c)(l + /?.) + 2^^-6(l + ^ ){(l + ^ )^ + (l + ^ )} . . _ . . 
(15) X{ = 1 , i,j = 1,2, i*j. 
D H  =  2 5 r - 2 { ( 4 - / 3 j ) 2  +  ( 4 j 8 j - l ) 2 } , B H = { ( 4 / 3 - l ) ( 4 - j 3 j )  +  ( 4 j 3 j - ï ) ( 4 - j 3 i ) }  
-  6(A-c)( 1 +  ^  )  + 25FT -6(1 + ~p ){(1 + /?.)Z j .  + (1 + /%)} 
Z, = * ^  U = U, z*J.  
D F  =  25 / - 2{(4 - ^ .)2 + (4g. -1)2} , B F  =  {  (4# -1)(4 - ~p.) + (4^. -1)(4 - g.)} 
T a b l e  4 . 5  T h e  p o s s i b l e  o u t c o m e s  o f  s p i l l o v e r  c h o i c e  u n d e r  t h e  g a m e  J  J  
1. All four firms choose minimal spillovers, e.g., f i i  = /T = p .  -  p .  =  0  
2 .  One firm chooses maximal spillovers while the other three firms choose minimal 
spillovers,e.g., /?,. = l,/?; = y?. = p. = 0 
3. Both firms in one country choose maximal spillovers while both firms in the other 
country choose minimal spillovers, e.g., /?. = Pj = 1,^. = p. = 0 
4. One firm in each country chooses maximal spillovers while the other firm in each 
country chooses minimal spillovers, e.g., /? = l,/?; = 0)y5. = 1,^ = 0 
5. Three firms choose maximal spillovers while the remaining firm chooses minimal 
spillovers,e.g., /?. = p. = ~p. = I,p. = 0 
6. All four firms choose maximal spillovers, e.g., p. = Pj = yg = yg = 1 
From the second order condition, we consider corner solutions with respect to 
spillovers (for the home firms >5 = 0 or P = 1, for the foreign firms P = 0 or P = 1 ), which is 
basically due to the assumption of the linear spillover costs. Since all four firms can choose 
two strategies (minimal or maximal spillovers), the total number of possible outcomes is 
sixteen. By the symmetry, it is enough to consider the six cases in Table 5. 
We derive the NEa in firms' decision of spillovers and illustrate the results further, 
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based on the numerical example with y  = 5, A  -  c  = 10. The payoff for each firm is described 
in table 6. The first outcome (j3i = /?y. = fi. = fj = 0) is the NE if k > ku = 6.0384 because 
nobody has an incentive to deviate (e.g., y, (0,0,0,0) > y,- (1,0,0,0) for k > k13 )• The outcome 
( Pi = 1,0j = P{ = ygy = 0 ) is never a NE because at least one firm has an incentive to deviate. 
For example, the home firm i  doesn't deviate if k  < &13 = 6.0384, home firm j  doesn't deviate 
i f  k  >  k u  =  7 . 9 0 2 8 ,  a n d  f o r e i g n  f i r m  i  ( o r  j )  d o e s n ' t  d e v i a t e  i f  k  <  3 . 9 3 2 3 .  B u t  n o  v a l u e  o f  k  
exists such that all three cases are satisfied. The outcome (/? = Pj = 1,/?. = p = 0) is the 
NE if 0.20048 =  k n < k <  k w  = 7.9028 because nobody has an incentive to deviate (if 
kn<k<ku, Vj(1,1,0,0)>y,(1,0,0,0)and y.(1,1,0,0)>y.(1,1,1,0)). 
Table 4.6 Payoff in firms' choice of spillovers under the game J  J  for y  =  5 , A - c  - 10 
(/w, Vi Vj Vt Vj 
(0,0,0,0) 3.778 3.778 3.778 3.778 
(1,0,0,0) 9.8164-k 1.3103 1.8147 1.8147 
(1,1,0,0) 9.2131-k 9.2131-k 0.0515 0.0515 
(1,0,1,0) 5.747-k 0.76714 5.747-k 0.76714 
(1,1,1,0) 8.3292-k 8.3292-k 0.25198-k 0.03364 
(1,1,1,1) 2.5978-k 2.5978-k 2.5978-k 2.5978-k 
The outcome ( P i  = \ , p .  = 0,p .  =  l , p j  =  0 )  is never a NE because at least one firm has an 
incentive to deviate. For example, the home firm j  doesn't deviate if k  >  7.56206, and 
foreign firm i doesn't deviate if k < 3.9323, but the value of k doesn't exist such that all two 
cases are satisfied. The outcome ( /?. = P} = p = 1, p = 0 ) is not a NE because at least one 
firm has an incentive to deviate. For example, the home firm j  doesn't deviate if k  <  7.56206, 
foreign firm i doesn't deviate if k < kn = 0.20048, and foreign firm j doesn't deviate if 
k > k12 = 2.56416 . But no value of k exists such that all three cases are satisfied. The 
76 
outcome ( /?. = fij = yg = fi. = 1 ) is a NE if £ < 612 = 2.56416 because nobody has an 
incentive to deviate (e.g., for 6 < 612 , (1,1,1,1) > (1,1,1,0) ). Table 7 provides the 
definition and numerical value of critical value of spillover costs, and corollary 2 summarizes 
the above results. 
Table 4.7 Definition (and numerical value) of critical value of spillover costs24 
614 = V, (1,1,0,0; & = = 0)--  V i  (0,1,0,0) = V j  (1,1,0,0; 6=0)-y, (1,0,0,0) 
— V; (0,0,1,1; = 0) - V i  (0,0,0,1) = V j  (0,0,1,1; k  =  0) - V j  (0,0,1,0) = 7.9028 
613 = y,; (1,0,0,0; £ = 0) - y, (0,0,0,0) = V j  (0,1,0,0; 6=0)-y, (0,0,0,0) 
= V i  (0,0,1,0; k  = 0) -  V i  (0,0,0,0) = V j  (0,0,0,1; 6=0)-y; (0,0,0,0) = 6.0384 
k12 =  v t  (1,1,1,1; 6 = 0)-v ,  (0,1,1,1) = V j  (1,1,1,1; 6 = 0)-v ,  (1,0,1,1) 
= V i  (1,1,1,1; k  =  0)-V i  (1,1,0,1) = V j  (1,1,1,1; 6 = 0)- V j  (1,11, ,0) = 2.56416 
k n  =  V , r (1,0,1,1; k  = 0)-V i  (0,0,1,1) = V j  (0,1,1,1; 6 = 0)-V i  (0,0,1,1) 
= V i  (U,l,0; k  =  = 0)-- vt (1,1,0,0) = y .  (1,1,0,1; 6 = 0)-Vj (1,10,0) = 0.20048 
k n  A A A 
Corollary 2: Consider a numerical example with y  =  5 , a - c  -10 under the game J  J  . Then 
a) if 6 > 614, the NE (#,y0;,#.,/?.) is (0,0,0,0). b) if 612<6 < jfc14, the NEa are (0,0,0,0), 
(1,1,0,0), or (0,0,1,1). c) if 6n<6<612, NEa are (1,1,1,1), (1,1,0,0), or (0,0,1,1). d) if 
k<kn, the NE is (1,1,1,1). 
Proof: See Table 6 and above explanation. 
24 We can derive the Nash equilibria analytically. The comparison between the firms' profits is very complex, 
and the calculations for each critical value of spillover costs are very tedious. The program, such as 'Scientific 
Notebook', may be helpful to check the results. 
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The final outcomes for each NE are as follows: 
Case 1: firms under the RJV in both countries choose minimal spillovers (/? = /? = 0 ) 
/ '  ( A 7 = Y ' = o = = ?  V 7 = T = o  
2b/ —o 
(/?" = X7 = °) = = q1 (P" = = 0), QJ1 (P" = /?" = 0) = 2Q^(A"C) 
25^ — 0 — o 
y/7(l/7 = = 0) = r(A-c) (25r-18) = -y7(^/7 = yj = 0) 
(25/-6) 
Case 2: firms under the RJV in both countries choose maximal spillovers (/? = /? = 1 ) 
W 7 = f = » = = T i P 1 = Â ' 7 = i )  
»"<A7  -  ^ 7=»=f^=?V7  -  f-».  e"(A7=A'7=«= 
25/ — 24 25/ — 24 
V j l  ( p j l  =  ~ p "  =  1 )  =  r ( A ~ c )  ( 2 5 ^ ~ 7 2 )  - i c  =  y J ~ }  ( p j l  =  =  1 )  
(25/-24) 
Case 3: firms under the RJV choose different spillovers between two countries. 
( P  *  P ( e . g . , p  =  0 , / ?  =  1 ) ) .  
/7(/?" = 0,y = 1) = 6(A-c)(5y-24) ^ (^7 = = 1)= 12(A-c)(5/-6) 
125/-450/+ 144 125/-450/+ 144 
,'
7(^7 = 0,y7 = 1) = 5r(4-f)(5/-24) ^ ^g ^,7 ^ ^ = 5/(A-c)(5/-6) 
125/-450/+ 144 * ^ 125/-450/+ 144 
y'7(/T = 0,r = 1) = X(A-cf(5/-24f(25/-18) 
(125/-450/+ 144) 
-7^7^^7^^/(A-c)\5/-6)\25/-72)_^ 
(125/-450/+ 144) 
2 'V7=o,y7  = i)  = wr(4-c)(i0r-30) 
125/-450/+ 144 
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4.4 The outcome comparison 
The central contribution of the R&D literature dealing with spillovers is to provide a 
performance comparison between R&D cooperation and non-cooperation, among firms that 
remain competitors in the product market (see d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and 
Kamien et al. (1992)). In this section, we examine under which case firms invest more in 
R&D and produce more final output. Aggregate outcomes are compared as well as individual 
outcomes. Aggregate R&D investment and final output are denoted by X and Q, respectively. 
We firstly compare aggregate outcomes between the game N N  and J N ,  and then we 
compare outcomes under the game J  J  with those under the game N N  and J N . 
aWf 2: a) /V" = 1) > % V" = 0) > y* = ^  > % V" = D > /V" = 0) 
b) %^(/^ = 1) > > X^(^ = 0) 
wheœ%"" = 2(y"+j""), X^ = 2(/" + /") 
c) = 1) > = 0) > q™ = q™ > q™ (/3J" = 1) > qJ" = 0) 
d) Q J " ( / 3 J "  =  ! ) >  Q ™  >  Q J " ( j 3 J "  = 0) <=> PJ " ( P J "  = 1) > p ™  >  p J " ( / 3 J "  = 0) 
Cooperative R&D efforts are greater (less) than non-cooperative efforts if firms 
within an RJV achieve complete (no) information sharing, that is, 
% J N  ( j 3 J N  = 1) > % N "  >  =  0) • This result holds if firms within an RJV can share 
more (less) than half the information from each other, that is, j 3  >1/2.23 Note that in our 
model partial spillovers (0< /?< 1) cannot be the firms' optimal choice on information 
sharing under the RJV, which is due to the assumption of linear spillover costs. The result is 
usually explained in terms of the 'free-rider' effect in the R&D literature where they focus on 
23 A similar result has been shown in previous studies where they focus on examining the role of involuntary 
spillovers in comparing R&D efforts between R&D non-cooperation and cooperation case (see d'Aspremont 
and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992)). 
79 
examining the role of involuntary exogenous spillovers. 
However, our results should be interpreted differently since we do not assume the 
existence of involuntary spillovers but consider complete endogeniety of spillovers under the 
RJV. First of all, we need to provide intuition as to why firms within an RJV share complete 
or no information. There are two ways to affect joint profits of the RJV. Firstly, firms under 
the RJV may try to increase the final market price by reducing R&D investment. This 
happens when firms within an RJV choose no information sharing, which decreases R&D 
investment (thus decreasing final output production), when compared to the R&D non-
cooperation. Secondly, firms under the RJV may target market share to increase their joint 
profits. One way to do that is to reduce unit production costs by increasing R&D investment, 
and this is accomplished when firms under the RJV achieve complete information sharing. 
Which way is more desirable to increase joint profits? It totally depends on spillover costs. 
When spillover costs are sufficiently high there is no reason why firms should incur 
sufficient spillover costs. Therefore, they choose to increase market price by sharing no 
information. However, when spillover costs are very low it is more profitable to increase 
R&D investment (thus final output and market share) by completely sharing information 
within an RJV. 
The result becomes reversed for non-cooperating firms. When cooperating firms 
(through forming an RJV) choose maximal spillovers non-cooperating firms invest less in 
R&D {% N N  > % N  {J3 J N  = 1) ), when compared to the R&D non-cooperation game, while they 
invest more when cooperating firms share no information within an RJV 
= 0) > ). Note that R&D effort is a strategic substitute between the 
cooperating and non-cooperating firms.24 This is confirmed by the fact that the slope of the 
reaction function is negative (see equation (10)). Cooperating firms have an incentive to 
increase R&D efforts when they completely share information within an RJV. This is 
because it gives them a cost advantage against non-cooperating firms who are competitors in 
a final market. Meanwhile, the non-cooperating firms' incentive to do R&D decreases as 
24 That is, the marginal profit of cooperating firms' R&D decreases as non-cooperating firms' R&D increases. 
Technically, dV2/d%JN d%JN < 0. For more detail, see Burlow et al. (1985). 
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cooperating firms increase R&D level since their marginal profit of own R&D decreases. 
Next, when cooperating firms do not share any information within an RJV they decrease 
R&D efforts compared to R&D non-cooperation (% N N  > % J N  ( f i J N  = 0) ). This is because by 
doing so they can make gains through increasing final market price. Then, by the nature of 
strategic substitutes it should be obvious that non-cooperating firms have an incentive to 
increase R&D efforts ( (/^ = 0) > and q~" = 0) > qN" ). In this case, it is 
interesting to see that per firm profit for non-cooperating firms exceeds the cooperating 
firm's profit (y™(ft™ = 0) > = 0) > VN" = V™ )• This result may be compared to 
merger's loss (Salant et al. 1983). In Salant et al. merged firms reduce their outputs to 
increase market price in the industry. However, merged firms lose, when compared to the 
equilibrium under the non-cooperation game, because firms outside of the merger expand 
their outputs. In our model, unlike the result of a merger's loss, cooperating firms (under the 
RJV) always make gains regardless of non-cooperating firms' reactions. Meanwhile, non-
cooperating firms benefit only if cooperating firms do not share any information within an 
RJV. 
Aggregate R&D efforts under the game 7 TV are greater (less) than under the 
game TV TV only if firms within an RJV achieve complete (no) information sharing, that is, 
= 1) > XNN > = 0). Recall that under the gameVW cooperating firms' 
R&D efforts increase (decrease) while non-cooperating firms' R&D levels decrease 
(increase), when compared to R&D level under the game N N , if firms within an RJV choose 
maximal (minimal) spillovers. However, the cooperating firms' decision on R&D efforts is 
crucial for this comparison in the sense that it always dominates the non-cooperating firms' 
decision, that is, JN NN —JN —NN > . This implies that the spillover choice under the 
RJV plays a key role in determining aggregate R&D levels. Thus, if it is difficult for firms to 
share information within an RJV (spillover costs are sufficiently high) then an RJV formation 
consisting of two firms yields less aggregate R&D efforts than under the R&D non-
cooperation. 
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Next, we compare outcomes under the game J J with those under the game NN and 
JN. As explained in the outcome comparison between the game NN and JN, there are two 
main effects of the R&D cooperation through forming an RJV on R&D levels: Competitive 
and anticompetitive effect. If spillover costs are very low then RJV formation in each country 
stimulates R&D competition between two countries. Firms within an RJV in each country 
have an incentive to increase R&D efforts by completely sharing information, when 
compared to both the game TV TV and JN, because it reduces unit production costs, thus 
increasing market share. This yields higher R&D levels under the game 7/ than under both 
the game NN and game JN (%1J (y3JJ = {?~J = 1) > (fl1N = 1) > x?N )• & is 
straightforward to show that aggregate R&D efforts and final output (market price) are the 
h i g h e s t  ( l e a s t )  u n d e r  g a m e  J  J  (  X J ~ J  ( P J J  =  f i "  =  1 )  >  X J "  { / 3 J N  =  1 )  >  X N N ,  
2" = ?" = l) > 2^ = l) > 2"" ). 
Result 3: 
a)/V'=T=i) > jT (/r=i)  > j r  > /  =o) > =o) 
b) = 1) > %^(^ = 1) > > X^(j9^ = 0) > %^(^ = ^  = 0) 
where, X^ = 2(%"+^) = 4/\ 
c) q J ~ J ( P j l  =  Y '  =  1) >  q J " ( J 3 J "  = !)> q ™  >  q ™ = 0) > q J ~ J ( f i 1  =  J "  =  0) 
d) Qjl(pjl = YJ = 1) > = !)> Q™ > Q^(^ = 0) > Qj1(0j1 = YJ = 0) 
<=> Pjl03JJ = ~PJJ = 1) < = !)< p™ < pJ" (ft" = 0) < Pj1(J3j1 = ~pJJ = 0) 
Meanwhile, the anticompetitive effect dominates if spillover costs are sufficiently 
high. As long as firms should incur high costs or face difficulties to share information within 
an RJV, they have an incentive to reduce R&D levels by sharing no information 
(%NN > X J N  i f i J N  = 0) > % J J  ( / 3 J J  -  p J J  -  0) ). This yields the lowest (highest) aggregate 
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R&D levels and final output (market price) when firms within an RJV in each country 
choose minimal spillovers. Note that symmetric minimal spillovers ( /3 J J  = f } 1 1  = 0) are 
chosen under the game J J  as long as spillover costs are sufficiently high ( k  >  k 2 ) regardless 
of whether we allow symmetry or asymmetry on information sharing between two countries. 
From the above results, we may conclude that allowing two RJVs in the industry 
(game JJ) brings about more competitive (anticompetitive) outcomes than allowing one 
RJV consisting of some firms in the industry (game JN ) or rejecting RJV formation (game 
N N  ) if spillover costs are sufficiently low (high). Thus, antitrust authorities should consider 
allowing RJV formation as much as possible for the industry with low spillover costs (or 
difficulties). Meanwhile, it may be more desirable that no RJV formation should be allowed 
for the industry with high spillover costs. 
4.5 Welfare implications 
In this section, we examine the welfare effects of the RJV and its policy 
implications. We consider two market structures: a "third-market" and an integrated market 
structure. The reason we add an integrated market, unlike Brander and Spencer (1983, 1985), 
is because there can be a negative effect of the RJV on consumer surplus. The objective of 
the government is to maximize domestic welfare. W  and W denote the welfare of the home 
and foreign country, respectively. Throughout section 3, we have derived the Nash Equilibria 
(NEa) of spillovers and R&D efforts (R&D stage). Focusing on these NEa, we investigate the 
welfare implications of the RJV. In each market structure, we ask two questions. First, given 
that the foreign country does not allow an RJV formation, when does the home country have 
an incentive to allow its domestic firms to form an RJV? Second, when do both countries 
have an incentive to allow an RJV formation in each country? To answer the second 
question, we identify the NE(a) of the policy game where both the home and the foreign 
countries simultaneously decide whether to allow an RJV or not, and provide the welfare 
implications for each NE of the policy game. Note that we take advantage of the game NN 
as the benchmark. 
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4.5.1 A "third-market" structure 
First, we consider a "third-market" in which all four firms compete with a 
homogenous good. The domestic welfare is equal to the sum of firm's profits 
(W = 2]y,,W = 2]yi i = l,2). 
i  i  
4.5.1.1 When only the home country allows an RJV formation 
Whether the home country can make welfare improvement by allowing an RJV 
formation, given that the foreign country does not, depends on both spillover costs and the 
degree of information sharing that the home firms choose under the RJV. Recall that we have 
two kinds of Nash Equilibria ( /? = /?y = 0, or /3i = = 1 ) in three domains of spillover 
costs ( k >  k 2 ,  k 1  <  k  <  k 2 ,  k < k 1 ) -  First, suppose that spillover costs are sufficiently high 
(k > k2)- Then, the home firms under the RJV choose symmetric minimal spillovers. The 
domestic welfare of the home country is higher under this outcome, when compared to the 
game NN (WJ" (/? = 0) -ty"" > 0). Thus, the government intervention may be 
unnecessary except for allowing an RJV formation. The benefits to the home country (firms) 
come from the fact that the home firms under the RJV do not share any information and they 
decrease cooperative R&D efforts. This is true, even though it sounds strange, because the 
home firms can increase final market price and thus their profits by doing so. 
Second, suppose that spillover costs lie in an intermediate level (jfc1 < k  < jfc2). Then, 
the home firms under the RJV choose symmetric minimal or maximal spillovers. If 
symmetric minimal spillovers under the RJV are guaranteed, then allowing an RJV formation 
benefits the home country. The same logic as the first case applies. However, if the home 
firms under the RJV choose maximal spillovers, then the home country is hurt in terms of the 
welfare, compared to the game N N  . As mentioned earlier, the firms can increase their profits 
by increasing market share, through complete information sharing within an RJV. But, for 
this range of spillover costs, the negative effects of spillover costs dominate the increased 
market share effect on the firms' profits. The policy implication is, ironically, the home 
government should not permit an RJV formation if the firms try to increase market share by 
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completely sharing information within an RJV (WJ*(/?, = P, -1)_ WN" <0). 
Lastly, suppose that spillover costs are sufficiently low ( k  <  k 1  )• Then, there exists 
another critical value of spillover costs (k° <kl where £° = VJ~"(1,1;& = 0) - vN" ), which 
determines whether allowing an RJV formation is beneficial for the home country. Note that 
the home firms under the RJV choose symmetric maximal spillovers for this range of 
spillover costs. If k°<k<k\ then the negative effects of spillover costs on the firms' profits 
(thus welfare) are still dominant. Therefore, it is not desirable for the government to allow an 
RJV formation. However, if k < k°, allowing an RJV formation benefits the home country 
because the firms' profits increase, which is due to the increased market share, compared to 
the game AT AT ( WJN ( p .  =  p .  =  \ ) - WNN > 0 ) .  
W , W  
W7"(U) 
v'*(U) 
k 
Figure 4.1 The welfare in a third market structure under the game J N  
Lemma 1: Suppose that the final products are produced for export to a 'third market'. Then, 
a) for k > k2, the home country is better off by allowing an RJV formation, b) for 
k1 < k < k1, it is desirable for the home government to allow its domestic firms to form an 
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RJV only if the choice of symmetric minimal spillovers under the RJV is guaranteed, c) for 
k < k1, there exists another critical value of spillover costs £° < &\ which determines 
whether allowing an RJV formation is beneficial for the home country 
Proof:a)^(A = A; = 0)-W^=20U-C)V'(3125rî-1625f + 2064"''-4746>>0 
{125/-210/+ 48} (25 / - 8) 
b)25, c) w'" (A = P,=1. * = 0) •- W""= !6r(A - c ?ur) , 2 *° < 2 
{125/-480/+ 192} (25/-8) 
/ „  ( y )  s  109375/ - 580000 / + 931200 / - 563200/ +110592 
Whether the welfare of the foreign country increases with the home firms' RJV 
formation depends on the degree of information sharing that the home firms choose under the 
RJV. As seen in Figure 1, the foreign country is always hurt when the home firms achieve 
complete information sharing within an RJV while it is benefited if the home firms choose 
minimal spillovers. The home firms, by completely sharing information under the RJV, have 
an incentive to invest more in R&D and produce more final outputs 
< x~^ = 1), qN" < qJ" (ft" = 1) ), which contracts foreign firms' production 
{%NN > = 1) ). It decreases the foreign firms' profits and thus 
its welfare. This may relate to the usual 'profit-shifting' result in the strategic trade policy 
literature. 
However, the foreign firms' profits increase if the firms in the home country choose 
minimal spillovers under the RJV. In this case, more surprisingly, the foreign firms' profit 
exceeds the home firms' profit. When the home firms choose minimal spillovers, they do so 
to increase price in a final market by investing less in R&D and producing less final output 
( X ™  > = 0),/" > = 0), and p N "  <  p J "  =  0 ) ) .  This benefits the 
foreign firms whose R&D investment and final production increase, when compared to the 
25 See the appendix for the critical values of spillover costs. The comparison of the size of critical values can be 
easily obtained using the program, such as 'Scientific Notebook'. 
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R&D non-cooperation game (%N < %N (fiJN = 0 ) ,q N N  < q N  { f i J N  = 0) ).26 
Lemma 2: Consider the third market structure. Suppose that the home country allows an RJV 
formation. Then, a) the foreign country is better (worse) off whenever the home firms choose 
minimal (maximal) spillovers under the RJV. b) the welfare of the foreign country exceeds 
the home country's welfare when the home firms choose minimal spillovers. 
Proof: a) iT(A -
{125/-210/+ 48} (25/-8f 
r*(fl = /?=D ,r».-64 0 ^ - ^ P 5 r - 3 2 ) ( 1 2 V - 5 6 ° r + 1 9 2 | <o 
' {125/2-480/+ 192} (25/-8)2 
b)r"(A = l8, = 0)-w" (A = /?; = 0) = 2°(A-c)Vza5y-22) > 0 
{125 Y  -  210/ + 48} 
4.5.1.2 When both countries have an incentive to allow an RJV 
In this sub-section, we provide the welfare implications when both the home and the 
foreign countries allow an RJV formation in each country while identifying NE(a) of the 
policy game where both the home and the foreign countries simultaneously decide whether to 
allow an RJV or not. As seen in Figure 2, there are many cases to consider. It looks complex 
to find NE(a) because there exist multiple NEa of spillovers both in game JN (or NJ ) and 
game JJ, and the welfare under each NE depends on several critical values of spillover 
costs. Given NE of spillovers and spillover costs, however, it is straightforward to find NE(a) 
of the policy game.27 
Suppose spillover costs are very low ( k <  k n ) -  Then, NE of the policy game is 
(Home: Allow RJV, Foreign: Allow RJV; hereafter RJV, RJV). The policy game leads to a 
p r i s o n e r ' s  d i l e m m a  r e s u l t  s i n c e  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  w o r s e  o f f  ( W J J ( 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 )  < W N N  ,  
26 This result may be compared to merger's loss in Salant et al. (1983) as we have briefly explained in section 4. 
27 See the appendix for the numerical example with / = 5 and A —c = 10. 
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\ y J J  (1,1,1,1) < yyNN ), when compared to the game N N , but each has a unilateral incentive to 
allow an RJV formation (#^(1,1) = %y^(ï,ï) > > w^(ï,ï) = W^(U) )- The 
intuition is, as long as spillover costs are sufficiently low, the firms under the RJV in any 
country try to increase market share by completely sharing information (/? = /? = !), which 
reduces firm's unit production cost, thus increases final outputs. However, the excessive 
R&D competition between the two countries (RJVs) results in the decrease of final market 
price, when compared to the R&D non-cooperation game ( p 1 J  ( / ?  =  / ?  =  ! ) <  P N N  ), which 
negatively affects firms' profits. Finally, the negative effects of spillover costs and the 
d e c r e a s e d  p r i c e  d o m i n a t e  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  m a r k e t  s h a r e .  T h i s  r e s u l t  a l s o  h o l d s  f o r  k n  < k  <  k *  
(where k *  W J J (1,1,1,1;6 = k * ) ~ W N J (U) = 0 or w " (1,1,1,1;6 = iO-W^CU) = 0) if the 
NE of spillovers ( /3i, , / ? . ,  (3. ) under the game JJ is (1,1,1,1) (For numerical example, see 
Table A1 in Appendix). 
W,W 
W  
\, 
X 
J N  (1,D 
U) = w/y(U, 
X 
= w 
i) 
wNJa,i) 
w 
JJ 0,0 
X 
0,0) = ^ '(0,0,0,0) 
F™(0,0)=w^(0,0) 
w^(0,0)=wjv7(ô,ô) 
- w
nn
= W
nn 
Wy/(U0,0) = W/y(0,0,l,l) 
W" (0,0,1,1)=^"(1,1,0,0) 
k11 k* k12 k° k1 
Figure 4.2 The welfare in the third market structure under the game JJ 
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However, for k* <k < kn and the NE of spillovers (1,1,1,1), the NEa of the policy 
game are (RJV, No RJV) and (No RJV, RJV) since Wy"(U) = W*J (U) > WN" = w"" but 
W J J (1,1,1,1) < W N J  (il), W J J (1,1,1,1) < W J N J  (I'l) (see Table A2). We cannot predetermine 
which country allows an RJV formation. The implication is the country that allows an RJV 
formation is better off while the other country, which does not allow it, is worse off, 
compared to the game NN. If both countries try to allow an RJV, then both will be hurt. If 
spillover costs lie between ku and k°, and the NE of spillovers under the game JJ is 
(1,1,0,5) or (0,0,1,1), the NE of the policy game is (RJV, No RJV) or (No RJV, RJV), 
respectively (see Table A3). That is, for the NE (1,1,5,0) the home country chooses 'Allow 
RJV' while the foreign country chooses 'Don't allow RJV, vice-versa for the NE (0,0,1,1). 
Suppose spillover costs lie between k °  and k l  (see Table A4); Then the NE of the 
policy game is (No RJV, No RJV). Neither country has an incentive to allow an RJV 
formation (ty^(l,l) = ^7^(1,1) < wN" = )• The spillover choice ((1,1,5,5) or (0,0,1,1)) 
under the game J  J  does not matter in the governments' decision. This result holds for 
k l < k < k 2  if the NE of spillovers is (1,1) (or ï,ï) in game J N  (or N J ), and (1,1,5,5) or 
(0,0,1,1) in game J J  (see Table A5). However, if the NE of spillovers is (0,0) (or 5,5) in 
game J N  (or N J  ), then the NE of the policy game is (RJV, No RJV) or (No RJV, RJV) 
(see Table A6). Each country has an incentive to allow its domestic firms to form an RJV 
(M^(0,0) = ^w7(0,5) > w"" = w^), if and only if the other country does not allow its 
firms to form an RJV (w^(5,5) = W n1 (0,0) > w^(0,0) = ^"(5,5) ). The result also holds 
for k 2 < k < k 1 4  if the NE(a) of spillovers are (0,0) (or 0,0) in game J N  (or N J )  and 
(1,1,5,5) or (0,0,1,1) in game J J  (see Table A6). Meanwhile, for k 1 3  < k  < k 2 ,  if the NE(a) 
of spillovers are (1,1) (or 1,1) in game J N  (or N J )  and (0,0,5,5) or (0,0,5,5) in game 
J J , we have two NEa (see Table A7): (No RJV, No RJV) and (RJV, RJV). For any country, 
it is beneficial to choose the same strategy as the other country chooses 
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(w/jV(0,0) = wNl(0,0) <WNN = wNN . w/7(1,1,1,1) = wJJ (1,1,i,i) >w"7(o,o)=w"7(0,0)). 
Since w11 (1,1,1,1) = 1/7 (1,1,1,1) > W N "  = W N N , it is likely that both countries try to give a 
signal of choosing the strategy 'Allow RJV'. 
Finally, for k ( >  k u )  >  k 1 3 , if the NE of spillovers is (0,0) (or 0,0 ) in game JN (or 
NJ) and (0,0,0,0) in game JJ (see Table A8), then the NE of the policy game is (RJV, 
R J V ) .  U n d e r  t h i s  o u t c o m e  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  b e t t e r  o f f ,  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  g a m e  N N  
(Wy7 (0,0,0,0) >WN", (0,0, Ô, 0) > )• Given that the other country allows an RJV, 
any country makes a welfare improvement even if it does not allow, and its welfare exceeds 
that in the country where an RJV is formed (w"7 (Ô, 0) > WJ" (0,0) >w"", 
^^(0,0) > ^7(Ô,Ô) > ). However, since 7 (0,0,0,0) > ^w7(5,5) and 
W^7(0,0,Ô,Ô) > ^7(Ô,Ô) both countries choose the strategy of 'Allow RJV. 
Lemma 3: Consider the third market structure. Then, a) if spillover costs are very low 
(k <kn), both countries choose the strategy 'Allow RJV under which they are worse off 
(prisoner's dilemma), b) If spillover costs are sufficiently high (k > jfc14), both countries also 
choose the strategy 'Allow RJV under which they are better off. 
Proof: NoteW J J  (1,1,U) = w "  (l,l,ï,l), W J J  (0,0,0,0) = y / J 1  (0,0,0,0), W N N  =  W * "  
a) w^(l,l) = ^7(ï,ï) > w™ = W™ (see Lemma 1 and 2) 
(25/ ~ 24 Y (125 f -480/+192)' 
W J J (1,1,1,U  = 0)-WNy (1,1) = — 16[(A ? 8(r) 2  s 2&'(> 2 k n )  >  o 
g ( Y )  =  109375 y 4 ~ 840000 y 3  + 2160000 y 2  - 2580480/ + 995328 
W^(1,LU;6 = 0)-w- = -16(A-c)V{625/ + 2800/-1728} ^ ^ 
(25/-24)= (25 y-8f 
b) W J " ( 0 , 0 )  >  W N " , W N ~ J  (0,0) > (see Lemma 1 and 2) 
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w"(0,0,ô,ô)-r"(ô,ô) = 2 0 y 2 ( A - c ) 2 ( 3 1 2 5 y * - H J S O y 2  + 13500/-2664) >„ 
( 2 5 y - 6 f ( 1 2 5 y 2 - 2 1 0 y  +  4 S ) 2  
<h0fim-w»»=mAA-cfa25r-324)>0 
(25r-6)2(25r-8)2 
4.5.2 An integrated market structure 
In this subsection, we provide the welfare effects of the RJV in an integrated market. 
Since the home and foreign countries consume, unlike in the third market structure, we 
should examine how the RJV formation affects consumers in order to analyze welfare 
effects. The objective of the government is to maximize the domestic welfare, which is equal 
to the sum of firms' profits and consumer surplus ( W  =  ^ y, +  «C5,  W  =  +  ,  
i  i  
where i  =  1,2). a ,  a  G  [0,1] denotes the consumption share of the home and foreign country, 
respectively. We assume that consumers in the two countries are identical, and that the 
consumption share is the same between the two countries for simplicity, i.e., a = a = 1/2.28 
# 2 
Thus, the consumer surplus for each country can be written by ^ C S , where C S  =  is 
the total consumer surplus. In the integrated market structure, the objective of the 
government may not be identical to that of the firms because the government is also 
concerned about the effects of the RJV on consumer surplus. We show that many results 
obtained from the third market structure are reversed in the integrated market structure. 
4.5.2.1 When only the home country allows an RJV formation 
Consider the game JN where the home country allows its domestic firms to form 
an RJV while the foreign country does not. The welfare implications are analyzed for three 
domains of spillover costs ( k  <  k 1 ,  k x  <  k  <  k 2 ,  k > k 2 ) -  Note that the payoff ( W , W  ) in 
each domain is determined by the home firms' choice on information sharing under the RJV. 
28 Allowing different consumption share between the two countries does not qualitatively change the results as 
long as the difference is not too big. 
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The Nash equilibrium(a) of spillovers (and R&D efforts) is - Pj-1 fork<k\ 
P i  ~  P j •  =  0 ,  o r  P t  =  P j  =  1  f o r  k l < k < k 2 ,  a n d  p .  =  P j  =  O f o r  k > k 2 -
First, suppose that spillover costs are sufficiently high ( k  >  k 2  )• Then, allowing an 
R J V  f o r m a t i o n  h u r t s  t h e  h o m e  c o u n t r y ,  w h e n  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  g a m e  N N  ( W J N  ( 0 , 0 )  <  W N N  ) •  
This is the opposite result from that obtained in the third market structure. The home firms' 
p r o f i t s  ( d o m e s t i c  w e l f a r e  i n  t h e  t h i r d  m a r k e t  c a s e )  a r e  h i g h e r ,  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  g a m e  N N ,  
when the home country allows an RJV formation (y^(0,0) > VN")- However, the 
consumers are hurt because the home firms' no information sharing under the RJV yields the 
increased market price (P™ (0,0) > pN" 4=> £/^(0,0) < QN" ). The increased firms' profits 
are overwhelmed by the consumer surplus loss (2|y^ (0,0) - yCSJ" (0,0) - CSN"\ )• 
Therefore, the home government should not allow an RJV formation as long as spillover 
costs are sufficiently high. 
Second, suppose that spillover costs lie in an intermediate level ( k 1  < k  < k 2 ) -  Then, 
the home firms under the RJV choose symmetric minimal or maximal spillovers. If 
symmetric minimal spillovers under the RJV are guaranteed, the home country is hurt. The 
same logic as the first case applies. However, if the home firms under the RJV choose 
maximal spillovers, then the home country experiences a welfare improvement, compared to 
the game NN (WJ* (1,1) > W^)• This is exactly the opposite result as in the third market 
structure where the home firms' profits (thus welfare) decrease with the RJV formation 
(yv^(l,l) < vN" )• The home firms' profits decrease even though their market share 
increases, by completely sharing information under the RJV, because the negative effects of 
spillover costs and the decreased market price dominate the increased market share effect on 
the firms' profits. The benefits in the home country come from the consumer gains, which 
result from the decreased market price (py"(l,l) < pN" <=> (2™ (1,1) > Q N " ) .  The consumer 
gains more than offset the decreased firms' profits ( 2^vJ" (1,1) - VN" < — CSJ" (1,1) - CSN" )• 
Therefore, the home government should allow an RJV formation only when the symmetric 
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maximal spillovers under the RJV are chosen. 
Lastly, suppose that spillover costs are sufficiently low ( k  <  k l  )• Then, the home 
country experiences welfare gains by allowing an RJV formation. Recall, in the third market 
structure, there exists another critical value of spillover costs ( £° < &1 ). We showed that 
y/jV(l,l) >VNN if k <k°, but yyjv(l,l)<yArA'if k°<k<k1. Therefore, for k <k° it is 
obvious  tha t  the  wel fa re  o f  the  home count ry  increases ,  when  compared  to  the  game NN,  
because the consumers make gains by the decreased market price ( CSJN (1,1) > CSNN )• Even 
if £° < k < kl, the home country makes welfare gains by allowing an RJV formation because 
2 V J N (1,1) ~ V N "  <  ^  CSyJV(U) - C S N N  . The policy implication is, as long as spillover costs 
are sufficiently low (&<£'), the home government should allow its firms to form an RJV 
formation. 
W , W  
• N N  
W J N ( U )  
Figure 4.3 The welfare in the integrated market structure under the game JN 
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As seen in figure 3, the foreign country is always hurt whenever the home firms 
achieve complete information sharing within an RJV. The foreign consumers are better off 
because of the decreased market price < pN"). But, the foreign firms' profits 
decrease, when compared to the game N N , because the home firms encroach on market 
share = 1) > qNN > q" (j3J* = 1) ). The decreased profits overwhelm the consumer 
gains ( 2 >1 
2 
C S J N  (1,1) - C S N N  )- Meanwhile, the foreign country is better off 
whenever the home firms choose minimal spillovers under the RJV. The intuition is exactly 
the same as in the previous case, though the direction of change is reversed. The foreign 
consumers are worse off because of the decreased market price ( p J N ( 0,0) > P N N ) .  But, the 
foreign firms' profits increase, compared to the game N N ,  because the market price 
increase, and also the foreign firms' market share increase 
{qJ" iP1" = 1) > qN* > qJ" i/31^ = 1) ). The consumer losses are overwhelmed by the 
1 increased profits ( 2 v'" (1,1) - v"" > ^ |cs"( l , l )  -  es™! ). 
Lemma 4: Consider the integrated market structure. Suppose that only the home country 
allows an RJV formation. Then, a) the home (foreign) country is worse (better) off whenever 
the home firms choose minimal spillovers under the RJV. b) the home (foreign) country is 
better (worse) off whenever the home firms choose maximal spillovers. 
(125 72-2107+ 48) (25 y  -  8) 
20(A-c)Y(6250^-15375/ + 10800y-1984} ^ ^ 
W  K P i ~  P j - v ) - W  :  t ~ —  ;  > u  
(125 y ~ 210r + 48) (25 7-8) '  
b) W^i/3; = = l;k = 0)  -  w"" =  1 6 y ( A . - c )  m ( y )  >  2 j f c 2 )  w h e r e  
(125 72 - 4807+ 192) (25V~ 8) 
m ( y )  =  {171875 y 4  -  910000 y 3  +1379200 y 2  -  6912007 + 110592} 
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- n i t o  -  a  i\ _ -320Y1 (A-c?{3125y3-19500y2 + 23040^-5888 ^ 
W  \ P i ~ P j ~ 1 )  W  :  T ~  ™ 3  < u  (125 72-480^+ 192) (25 y-8)2 
4.5.2.2 When both countries have an incentive to allow an RJV in each country 
In this sub-section, we identify the NE(a) of the policy game where both the home 
and the foreign countries simultaneously decide whether to allow an RJV or not, and provide 
the welfare implication of each NE. Recall that we have (0,0) (or 0,0) and (1,1) (or 1,1) in 
game J N (or NJ ) while (0,0,5,5), (1,1,5,5), (0,0,1,1), and (1,1,1,1) in game J J for NE(a) 
of spillovers, and we identified the range of spillover costs for each NE of spillovers. 
W , W  
"(1,1,0,0) =^JJ (0,0 
w J N m ) = w N l m )  
jy/7(o,o,5,5)=w/7(o,o,5,5) 
— TITNN _ —NN 
w^(0,0)=^y(0,0) 
w/7(o,o,U)=wy7(u5,5) 
Figure 4.4 The welfare in the integrated market structure under the game J J 
Suppose spillover costs are very low, k  <  fc11 (see Table A9). Then, the NE of the 
policy game is (RJV, RJV) under which both countries are better off, compared to the game 
N N  (w/7 (1,1,1,1) > W N " , ï^/7(l,l,ï,ï) > W^). This is exactly the opposite case as in the 
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third market structure. The intuition is that firms' profits decrease due to the excessive 
competition between the two countries (RJVs), but consumer surplus increase because of the 
decreased market price. The increased consumer surplus dominates the decreased firms' 
C S J N  (1,1,1,1) - C S N N  )• This result profits (2|yyw(l,l,ï,ï)-V'AW v J N ax i ,D-v N N  < 
2 
also holds for k n < k < k * *  (where k * *  satisfies that W J J (1,1,1,1;& = k**)-W N N  = 0 or 
(1,1,1,1; & = £**) - w™ = 0 ) if the NE of spillovers is (1,1,1,1) in game J J (see Table 
A9). However, for £**<£< kn and the NE of spillovers (1,1,1,1), the policy game leads to a 
prisoner's dilemma result (see Table A10). The NE of the policy game is (RJV, RJV). Both 
countries are worse off (w" (1,1,1,1) < WN", pj7yy(l,l,M) <^NN), but each country has an 
incentive to allow an RJV ( Wy^(l,l) = W^(ï,ï) > WN" = W™ > WN~J (1,1) = îy7^(ï,ï) ). This 
sharply contrasts with Motta's result (1996) that both the home and foreign countries always 
improve their domestic welfare in the integrated market structure by the RJV formation in 
each country. 
Meanwhile, for k n < k <  k 1  and the NE of spillovers (1,1,0,6) and (0,0,1,1) in game 
J J, the NE of the policy game is (RJV, No RJV) and (No RJV, RJV), respectively (see 
Table All). The country which allows an RJV formation is better off, compared to the game 
NN, while the other country, which does not allow its domestic firms to form an RJV, is 
worse off (w7"(U) = (ï>ï) > W"" = W™ > W^tU) = WV"(1'1) )• This result also 
holds for kx<k<k2 if the NE of spillover are (1,1) (or 1,1) in game JN (or NJ ), and 
(1,1,0,0) or (0,0,1,1) in game/7. 
For k ( >  k u )  >  k l , if the NE of spillovers is (0,0) (or 0,0 ) in game J N  (or N J  ), the 
NE of the policy game is (No RJV, No RJV) regardless of the NE of spillovers in 
game// (see Table A12). This is because neither country has an incentive to allow an RJV 
(W^(0,0) = wN7m) < WN" = W™ < W"7(Ô,Ô) = tpy^(0,0) ). One thing to note is that the 
NE (No RJV, No RJV) is welfare inferior to the NE of spillovers (0,0) (or 0,0 ) in game JN 
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(or NJ) and (0,0,0,0) in game J J (w" (0,0,0,0) >WNN ,  w" (0,0,0,0) >wNN)-
Lemma 5: Consider the integrated market structure. Then, a) if spillover costs are very low 
(k < ku), both countries choose the strategy 'Allow RJV' under which they are better off. b) 
If spillover costs are sufficiently high (k > ku ), both countries choose the strategy 'Don't 
allow RJV', which is a welfare inferior outcome. 
Proof: a) WJN  (1,1) = w"J  (U) > WNN = w"N > WNJ  (U) = w'N (U) (see Proposition 4) 
Wr,<XiXU - 0)-^(U) = :«r(A-cf(6875/-4,M0/+,3120r-41472) > , 
(25Y - 24) (125 / -480 Y +192)2 
W/7(l,l,l,l;£ = 0)-W™ = 16r(A~c) (175r~72) =2km> 2kn 
{25^-24} (25 y ~ 8) 
b) WJN (0,0) = wNJ (0,0) < wNN = WNN < WNJ (0,0) = w"(Ô,Ô) (see Proposition 4) 
^(0,0,5,5,-^(5,5, - , 0 (257 " 6) (125 Y ~ 210 y + 48)' 
y 
(25y-6X(25y-8r 
WJJ (0,0,0,0) - = __1QQ('A2 ^ Y—- > 0 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter examines the role of RJV (or R&D cooperation) in the presence of 
international competition. Unlike previous studies where information sharing within an RJV 
is treated as exogenous, we allow it to be determined endogenously. The main questions are 
whether firms under the RJV choose to completely share their information, and whether any 
government should allow its domestic firms to form an RJV to maximize total welfare. 
Regarding the first question, we show that firms under the RJV do not share any information 
if spillover costs are sufficiently high while they choose maximal spillovers within an RJV if 
spillover costs are sufficiently low. The minimal spillovers within an RJV are chosen due to 
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the anticompetitive reasons. This result contrasts with previous studies where complete 
information sharing within an RJV is usually assumed. We also find that multiple Nash 
equilibria may exist. Under the game JN , symmetric minimal and maximal spillovers are 
chosen within an RJV when spillover costs lie in an intermediate range ( k 1  <  k  <  k 2 ) -
Meanwhile, under the game J J , symmetric minimal (0,0,0,0) and asymmetric spillovers 
((1,1,0,0) or (0,0,1,1)) or symmetric maximal (1,1,1,1) and asymmetric spillovers ((1,1,0,0) 
or (0,0,1,1)) between the two countries (RJVs) turn out to be the Nash equilibria for a 
m o d e r a t e  r a n g e  o f  s p i l l o v e r  c o s t s  (  k n  <  ( k l )  < k <  ( k 2 )  <  k 1 4 ) -
To provide the answer as to whether any government should allow its domestic 
firms to form an RJV to maximize total welfare, we consider two final markets: a 'third 
market' and an integrated market. We show that many results obtained in the third market 
structure become reversed in the integrated market structure. For example, consider the case 
where only the home country allows an RJV formation while the foreign country does not. If 
spillover costs are sufficiently high ( k > k2 ), allowing an RJV benefits the home country in 
the third market, but it hurts the home country in the integrated market. It is basically due to 
the home firms' choice of spillovers under the RJV. They choose symmetric minimal 
spillovers, which yields the increased final market price. The home firms' profits increase, 
but the consumer surplus decreases. The consumer loss dominates the increased home firms' 
profits. If spillover costs lie in an intermediate range (kl < k < k2), the home country is better 
off only under the outcome ( fii = /?; = 0 ) in the third market, but only under the outcome 
(/?. = /?; = 1 ) in the integrated market. Lastly, suppose that spillover costs are sufficiently 
low (k < k1 )• Then, it is always beneficial for the home country to allow an RJV formation in 
the integrated market structure. Meanwhile, there exists a critical value of spillover costs 
k °  ( <  k 1 )  i n  t h e  t h i r d  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  h o m e  c o u n t r y  i s  b e t t e r  o f f  o n l y  i f  k  <  k °  •  
We also identify the NE(a) of the policy game where both the home and the foreign 
countries simultaneously decide whether to allow an RJV or not, and investigate the welfare 
implications when both the home and foreign countries allow an RJV formation in each 
c o u n t r y .  F i r s t ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  t h i r d  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e .  I f  s p i l l o v e r  c o s t s  a r e  v e r y  l o w  ( k < k n ) ,  
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the NE of the policy game is (RJV, RJV), but under this outcome both countries are hurt, 
which leads to a prisoner's dilemma result. The excessive R&D competition between the 
two countries (RJVs), by completely sharing information within an RJV, yields the increased 
market share, but the decreased market price. The negative effects of spillover costs and the 
decreased market price dominate the increased market share effect on the firms' profits. 
Meanwhile, if spillover costs are sufficiently high (k > k14 ), then the NE of the policy game 
is (RJV, RJV), and under this outcome both countries are better off, compared to the R&D 
non-cooperation game ( NN ). If spillover costs are between kn and ku, it may be a little bit 
complex to provide policy implications since we have multiple NE(a) of the policy game, 
which are basically due to multiple NEa of spillovers both in game JN (or NJ ) and game 
J J. However, given that the NE is identified, it is straightforward to provide the welfare 
implications for each NE. 
Some different results are obtained in the integrated market structure. If spillover 
costs are very low (k < fc11), the NE of the policy game is (RJV, RJV). Under this outcome 
both countries are better off, which is opposite to the results in the third market structure. It is 
because, even though the firms are hurt by the excessive R&D competition, the consumer 
gains due to the decreased market price overwhelm the firms' losses. Meanwhile, if spillover 
costs are sufficiently high (k > k14 ), then the NE of the policy game is (No RJV, NO RJV). 
This outcome is welfare inferior in the sense that both countries can make welfare gains if 
they choose the strategy 'Allow RJV. 
There are some possible extensions of this chapter. The first extension is to check 
the results obtained in the paper with the general functional forms. As mentioned above, the 
corner solution of spillovers is due to the assumption of linear spillover costs while we can 
get partial spillovers with a quadratic form of spillover costs. Thus, to get more meaningful 
and robust results, it is necessary to check the ideas in this chapter with more general 
functional forms. The second idea is to introduce asymmetric spillover costs among firms, 
which may be more realistic in the sense that the firms are likely to differ in the ability to 
absorb or assimilate their rivals' knowledge. Also, introducing involuntary spillovers 
between intra-country and inter-country may help examine the robustness of the results 
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obtained by Steurs (1997). The third idea is to consider an alternative decision rule for the 
RJV. The literature uniformly assumes joint profit maximization, and focuses on the effect of 
information sharing under the RJV. Introducing cost sharing and risk sharing for the RJV and 
assuming own profit maximization may be more reasonable. Finally, examining the optimal 
number of RJVs in an industry and checking whether there may be any optimal policy 
(subsidy or tax) on R&D cooperation (RJV formation) may be necessary studies. 
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Appendix A. Critical values of spillover costs 
12y(A-c)=A(r) 
k1 = Vt (1,0, & = 0) - Vi (0,0) = 
(125 y ~ 470/ + 4207 - 96) (125 Y ~ 2107 + 48) 
/ i(7) = 27343757s - 22921875 7' + 804550007® + 1536250007s -173506274 
-11796736 73 + 46949376 72 -100270087 + 884736 
it2 ^ y,(i,l,* = 0) - Vi (0,1) = l2y(A c) hir) 
(125 73 - 470 72 + 4207 - 96)2 (125 y2 - 4807 +192)2 
/2(7) = 273437577 + 1673562507e - 445805007s + 6886152007^ - 629081600 73 
+ 331616256 7' - 927498247 +10616832 
£u = y, (1,0,1,1; t = 0)-y, (0,0,1,1) = yy (0,1,1,1; k = 0) - yy (0,0,1,1) 
s y(. (1,1,1,0; k  =  0 ) -  y .  (1,1,0,0) = y  j (1,1,0,1; k  =  0) - y y (1,10,0) 
= 127 (A-c)2 01 (7) 
(125 73 - 710 72 + 9OO7 - 288)2 (125 y2 ~ 4507 +144)2 
01 (7) = 2734375 7" - 49421875 y1 + 356535000 y6 -1317081000 y5 + 2675323800 y4 
- 3017571840 73 +1842103296/-5733089287 + 71663616 
&12 = 7, (1,1,1,1; t = 0)-y, (0,1,1,1) = y y (1,1,1,1; t = 0)-y, (1,0,1,1) 
= y,. (1,1,1,1; & =0)- y. (1,1,0,1) = yy (1,1,1,1; k  =  0 ) ~  y j  (1,11, ,0) 
= 127(A-C)2<|>2(7) 
(125 73 - 7IO72 + 9007 - 288)2(257 - 24)2 
02 (/) = 109375 y6 -1346875 7s + 6145050 7'-13119540 y3 +14160096 y2 
-74442247 + 1492992 
13 
= y, (1,0,0,0; A: = 0) - y, (0,0,0,0) == y y (0,1,0,0; k = 0) - y, (0,0,0,0) 
= y, (0,0,1,0; k  =  0 ) ~  y. (0,0,0,0) = yy (0,0,0,1; k  =  0 ) ~  yy (0,0,0,0) 
127 (A-c)2 03 (X) 
(125 73 - 440 72 + 3607 - 72)' (257 - 6)2 
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03 (/) = 109375 /6-521875 / + 949800 y* - 846660 /3 + 389016 y2 - 88128/ + 7776 
kH = Vi (1,1,0,0; k = 0) - y, (0,1,0,0) = V j (1,1,0,0; k = 0)~ y, (1,0,0,0) 
= Vi (0,0,1,1; k = 0) - Vi (0,0,0,1) = y (0,0,1,1; k = 0) - y (0,0,1,0) 
i 2 r  ( -A  - c ) 2  04  (y )  
(125 /3 - 440 y2 + 360Y ~ 72)' (125 / - 450/ +144)' 
$^(/) = 2734375/-30109375/ + 133841250/-312121500/ + 417520800/ 
- 327825360 /3 +147518496 y2 - 34945344/ + 3359232 
t«=W"(A = /S,=i>=o)-t"""= 8r(A-c)'/,(r) 
{125/2-480/+ 192} (25 y-8)2 -
/„ (7) = 109375/4 - 580000 y3 + 931200/- 563200/ +110592 
/1 (y) = 109375 /4 - 840000 / + 2160000 /2 - 2580480/ + 995328 
k * *  =  ^ { 2 V j l  (1,1,1,1; £ = 0) + -^ C S J J  (1,1, U)} - ^  {2V ™ + ^  CS ""} 
_ 8/(A-c)2 (175/-72) 
~ {25/-24}2(25/-8)2 
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Appendix B. NE(a) of the policy game: Numerical example ( y  =  5, A - c  =  10 ) 
Each table describes payoff (Home welfare, Foreign welfare) for the policy game between 
the home and the foreign countries. The payoff depends on the domain of spillover costs and 
the NE of spillover costs both in game JN (or NJ ) and in game J J. The bold letter in 
each table denotes the NE of the policy game. 
<Third market> 
Table Al. k <  ( & " )  < k *  =  2.5425, (1,1) (or 1,1 ) in J N  (or N J  ), (1,1,1,1) in J  J .  
Don't allow RJV Allow RJV 
Don't allow RJV (6.7938,6.7938) (0.1106,18.215-2k) 
Allow RJV (18.215-2k, 0.1106) (5.1956-2k, 5.1956-2k) 
Table A2. 2.5425 =  k * < k < k 1 2  =  2.56416, (1,1) (or 1,1) in J N  (or N J ) ,  (1,1,1,1) in J  J  .  
Don't allow RJV Allow RJV 
Don't allow RJV (6.7938,6.7938) (0.1106,18.2152k) 
Allow RJV (18.215-2k, 0.1106) (5.1956-2k, 5.1956-2k) 
Table A3. 0.20048 = &"<&<&" = 5.7106, (1,1) (or 1,1 ) in JN (or NJ ), (1,1,0,0) in J J. 
Don't allow RJV Allow RJV 
Don't allow RJV (6.7938,6.7938) (0.1106,18.215-2k) 
Allow RJV (18.2152k, 0.1106) (18.426-2k, 0.10305) 
Table A4. 5.7106 = k° < k < kl = 5.7464, (1,1) (or 1,1) in J N  (or N J ) ,  (1,1,0,0) in J  J .  
Don't allow RJV Allow RJV 
Don't allow RJV (6.7938,6.7938) (0.1106, 18.215-2k) 
Allow RJV (18.215-2k, 0.1106) (18.426-2k, 0.10305) 
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Table A5. 5.7464 =  k ï < k < k 2  =  7.8826, (1,1) (or 1,1) in J N  (or N J ) ,  (1,1,0,0) in J J  .  
Don't allow RJV Allow RJV 
Don't allow RJV (6.7938,6.7938) (0.1106,18.215-2k) 
Allow RJV (18.215-2k, 0.1106) (18.426-2k, 0.10305) 
Table A6. 5.7464 = = 7.9028, (0,0) (or 0,0)in J N  (or N J ) ,  (1,1,0,0) in J J .  
Don't allow RJV Allow RJV 
Don't allow RJV (6.7938, 6.7938) (7.4489,6.8609) 
Allow RJV (6.8609,7.4489) (18.426-2k, 0.10305) 
Table A7. 6.0384 s k13 < k < k 
\ 
2 
= 7.8826, (1,1) (or 1,1) in J N  (or N J ) ,  (0,0,5,Ô) in J J .  
Don't allow RJV Allow RJV 
Don't allow RJV (6.7938,6.7938) (0.1106, Î8.2l5-2k) 
Allow RJV (Î8.2l5-2k, 0.1106) (7.556,7.556) 
Table A8. k ( >  k w )  >  k 13 = 6.0384, (0,0) (or 0,0) in J N  (or N J ) ,  (0,0,0,0) in J J .  
Don't allow RJV Allow RJV 
Don't allow RJV ' (6.7938,6.7938) (7.4489,6.8609) 
Allow RJV (6.8609, 7.4489) (7.556,7.556) 
«(Integrated market> 
Table A9. k ( <  k u )  <  k * *  =  2.323, (1,1) (or 1,1 ) in JN (or NJ ), (1,1,1,1) in J J .  
Don't allow RJV Allow RJV 
Don't allow RJV (25.057, 25.057) (24.192,42.297-2k) 
Allow RJV (42.297-2k, 24.192) (29.7032k, 29.703-2k) 
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Table A10.0.20048 =  k n < k <  k 1 2  = 2.56416, (1,1) (or 1,1 ) in JN (or NJ), (1,1,1,1) in J J  
Don't allow RJV Allow RJV 
Don't allow RJV (25.057, 25.057) (24.192,42.297-2k) 
Allow RJV (42.297-2k, 24.192) (29.703 2k, 29.703-2k) 
Table All. 0.20048 =  k n < k < k 2  =  7.8826, (1,1) (or 1,1) in J N  (or N J ) ,  (1,1,0,0) in J  J 1  
Don't allow RJV Allow RJV 
Don't allow RJV (25.057,25.057) (24.192,42.297-2k) 
Allow RJV (42.297-2k, 24.192) (42.503-2k, 24.179) 
Table A12. 5.7464 = k x < k < k u  = 7.9028, (0,0) (or 0,0) in J N  (or N J  ) ,  (1,1,0,0) in J  J  
Don't allow RJV Allow RJV 
Don't allow RJV (25.057,25.057) (25.42,24.832) 
Allow RJV (24.832,25.42) (42.5O3-2k, 24.179) 
Table A13. k  >  k l  = 5.7464, (0,0) (or 0,0) in J N  (or N J ) ,  (0,0,0,0) in J J  ?  
Don't allow RJV Allow RJV 
Don't allow RJV (25.057,25.057) (25.42,24.832) 
Allow RJV (24.832, 25.42) (25.21, 25.21) 
1 For ( 0,0,1,1 ), the NE of the policy game is (Home: No RJV, Foreign: RJV) 
2 The NE (No RJV, No RJV) is welfare inferior since WNN < WJJ, W*" < w" 
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary 
This dissertation consists of three essays investigating the welfare implications of 
R&D policies in the presence of spillovers. The research joint venture (RJV) formation and 
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection are considered as tools of R&D policies. The first 
essay (chapter 2) investigates the policy implications of an RJV. Unlike previous studies, the 
degree of spillovers (information sharing) within an RJV is determined endogenously. We 
assume that the RJV is costly in the sense that firms incur two kinds of costs: RJV formation 
costs and spillover costs. We find that firms within an RJV do not share any information if 
spillover costs are sufficiently high, and that private interests with an RJV are not consistent 
with public interests for a wide range of parameter values. The main policy implications are 
as follows. First, if spillover costs are sufficiently high but the degree of involuntary 
spillovers is sufficiently low, then the government should discourage firms from joining in an 
RJV for relatively low RJV formation costs. However, it does not have to implement any 
policy for relatively high RJV formation costs since private and public interests are 
consistent. Second, if both spillover costs and the degree of involuntary spillovers are 
sufficiently high, then government intervention is unnecessary for very low or very high RJV 
formation costs, while it should encourage firms to join in an RJV for median RJV formation 
costs. Finally, when spillover costs are sufficiently low, the same results as in the second case 
are obtained, but it is shown that the critical value of RJV formation costs is different. 
The second essay (chapter 3) examines the welfare effects of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) protection in the north-south trade context. We ask which southern countries, if 
any, should provide more IPR protection, assuming that the differentiated IPR protection 
among southern countries can be made through a WTO agreement. We consider a situation 
where only the northern country innovates, and n-1 southern countries have different 
capacities to absorb knowledge spillovers from the northern innovations. The spillover share, 
which is defined as the spillovers in any country divided by the sum of spillovers for all 
countries, plays a crucial role in determining the welfare effects of IPR protection. Some 
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findings obtained in this essay are as follows. The spillover expansion from relaxed IPR 
protection in any southern country may or may not reduce the unit production cost, 
depending on the spillover share. The profit of the firm always increases whenever its unit 
production cost decreases with spillovers. There is a possibility that the profit effect of 
spillovers is also positive even when it raises unit production costs. This happens when the 
R&D efficiency of the northern firm is sufficiently low or if the spillover share is not too big. 
Meanwhile, the effects of relaxed IPR protection in any southern country on aggregate output 
and consumer surplus are negative unless the sum of spillovers is relatively small and the 
R&D efficiency is very low. 
The welfare effects of spillovers depend on both the consumption share and the 
spillover share. The southern countries can be classified into three groups in terms of welfare 
effects of spillovers. The countries in the first group are better off from relaxed IPR 
protection both in their own countries and in the other countries. The countries in the second 
group are better off from spillovers in their country, but worse off from spillovers in the other 
group. The third group suffers from welfare loss when IPR protection is relaxed in any 
southern country. 
The last essay (chapter 4) combines the analysis of the R&D cooperation with the 
strategic trade policy theory. It investigates the role of RJV (or R&D cooperation) in the 
presence of international competition. We endogenize spillovers (information sharing) within 
an RJV, and assume that firms must incur costs to increase the amounts of information 
sharing. Many results obtained in the third market structure become reversed in the integrated 
market structure. In the situation where only the home country allows an RJV formation 
while the foreign country does not, if spillover costs are sufficiently high, allowing an RJV 
benefits the home country in the third market, but it hurts the home country in the integrated 
market. It is basically due to the home firms' choice of spillovers under the RJV. They 
choose symmetric minimal spillovers, which yields the increased final market price. The 
home firms' profits increase, but the consumer surplus decreases. The consumer loss 
dominates the increased home firms' profits. If spillover costs lie in an intermediate range, 
the home country is better off only under the outcome of minimal spillovers within an RJV in 
the third market, but only under the outcome of maximal spillovers within an RJV in the 
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integrated market case. Meanwhile, as long as spillover costs are very low, allowing an RJV 
is always beneficial for the home country both in the third market and integrated market 
structure. 
We also identify the NE(a) of the policy game where both the home and the foreign 
countries simultaneously decide whether to allow an RJV or not, and investigate the welfare 
implications. In the third market structure, if spillover costs are very low, the NE of the 
policy game is (RJV, RJV), but under this outcome both countries are hurt, which leads to a 
prisoner's dilemma result. The excessive R&D competition between the two countries 
(RJVs), by completely sharing information within an RJV, yields the increased market share, 
but the decreased market price. The negative effects of spillover costs and the decreased 
market price dominate the increased market share effect on the firms' profits. Meanwhile, if 
spillover costs are sufficiently high, then the NE of the policy game is (RJV, RJV), and under 
this outcome both countries are better off, compared to the R&D non-cooperation game. 
Some different results are obtained in the integrated market structure. If spillover costs are 
very low, the NE of the policy game is (RJV, RJV). Under this outcome both countries are 
better off, which is opposite to the results in the third market structure. It is because, even 
though the firms are hurt by the excessive R&D competition, the consumer gains due to the 
decreased market price overwhelm the firms' losses. Meanwhile, if spillover costs are 
sufficiently high, then the NE of the policy game is (No RJV, No RJV). This outcome is 
welfare inferior in the sense that both countries can make welfare gains if they choose the 
strategy 'Allow RJV. 
5.2 Suggestions for future research 
Following the literature we assumed joint profit maximization under the RJV. 
However, whether this assumption is appropriate requires further analysis since it is difficult 
to believe that firms can write the contracts to maximize joint profits especially when they 
are competitors in a final market. Also, the profit per firm under the RJV is likely to depend 
on its own R&D spending. Then, it may be more profitable for the firm to deviate from joint 
profit maximization by maximizing its own profit, choosing own R&D spending. Thus, it is 
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worthwhile to study the relevancy of 'joint profit maximization' assumption under the RJV. 
One implicit assumption we made in chapter 2 and chapter 3 is that R&D outcomes 
of one firm are always beneficial for the other if firms can share information completely. 
However, each firm may pursue different research projects, thus the nature of final R&D 
outcomes may also differ across firms. Therefore, the amounts that each firm absorbs in 
knowledge spillovers may depend on whether these outcomes are substitutable or 
complimentary. Introducing different R&D outcomes is obviously more realistic, and it may 
help us understand the role of information sharing. 
It is hard to believe that technologies that the northern firm produces are always 
appropriate for the use of all southern countries. Thus, it is worthwhile to extend the issue of 
IPR protection (chapter 3) by introducing appropriate technology for southern countries. 
Also, the direct extension of chapter 3 would include investigating optimal patent policy in 
terms of domestic welfare or how to reach an agreement on IPR protection that is Pareto 
improving. Meanwhile, one extension of chapter 4 could include the analysis of the optimal 
number of RJVs in an industry, and the comparison of RJV with R&D subsidy or tax may be 
interesting. Finally, the models in each essay are very specific, and we need to check the 
robustness of the results with more general functional forms. 
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